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THESIS

CREDIBLE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE FOR JAPAN

by

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March 2000

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CREDIBLE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE FOR JAPAN

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

The credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent extended to Japan has decreased in recent years due to the declining role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy. The U.S. nuclear guarantee is an important element of Japan's security strategy, and the United States should maintain it.

To reassure Japan of U.S. nuclear commitments without provoking domestic Japanese opposition or potential adversaries, the United States should improve the perception of its resolve to defend Japan with nuclear weapons while continuing to pursue ballistic missile defenses and modest nuclear arms reductions. This will strengthen U.S.-Japan alliance bonds, reduce the likelihood of nuclear proliferation, and reduce the threat of nuclear attack against Japan and U.S. forces based in Japan.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The role that nuclear weapons play in U.S. strategy has changed since the end of the Cold War. How has this affected the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella for Japan, and what level of credibility is appropriate now to help maintain a healthy alliance and best achieve U.S. regional objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and stability? These questions are the focus of this thesis.

During most of the Cold War the Japanese believed the United States communicated clearly to its allies and to the Soviet Union how and why it would employ nuclear weapons. This clarity increased the credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence because allies and adversaries alike understood U.S. intentions and believed its threats to a high degree. Now it is not clear when the United States would employ nuclear weapons, and this affects U.S. credibility.

If U.S. credibility is weak, the Japanese may be compelled to seek nuclear protection under some other power, claim neutrality, or seek independent nuclear forces. If it is too strong, they may become alienated from the alliance or fear entanglement in a U.S. precipitated nuclear conflict. Any of these scenarios would weaken the U.S.-Japan alliance or cause it to collapse, encouraging nuclear proliferation and threatening regional stability.

This thesis estimates the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee for Japan and its effect on the alliance by applying nuclear deterrence and alliance politics theories. First, it uses nuclear deterrence theory as explained by Dean Wilkening and Kenneth Watman in their 1995 RAND publication entitled *Nuclear Deterrence in a Regional Context*. Their theory includes the basic components of nuclear deterrence credibility. Second,

this thesis uses theories explained by Stephan M. Walt and Glenn H. Snyder that describe why alliances may dissolve or strengthen.

This thesis explores another dimension of the U.S.-Japan nuclear alliance. It remains difficult for the United States to extend nuclear deterrence to Japan. The United States and Japan have very different views concerning nuclear weapons. The United States is the only country to have ever attacked another with nuclear weapons, and Japan was the target. This stark reality affects the strategic cultures of both nations and has affected the U.S.-Japan alliance in many ways. This thesis explores ways to reassure Japan of U.S. nuclear commitments without provoking domestic Japanese opposition.

Finally, this thesis recommends that the United States increase its efforts to improve the perception of U.S. commitment to Japan while continuing to pursue modest nuclear arms reductions and missile defenses. These measures can effectively counter misperceptions about the lack of U.S. commitment to the nuclear defense of Japan without overly provoking either the Japanese public or potential adversaries.

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Colonel Paul Peyton, chairman, department of regional studies, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii, reviewed my thesis and provided me with extensive feedback, he also arranged for me to meet with his entire staff for several hours to discuss my topic. The generous support that he and his staff extended was very helpful for me in forming a more balanced view of my topic.

Mr. Sam Jameson, who is reporter for the *Asian Business Magazine* and *Denver Post*, columnist for the *Sankei Shimbun*, and senior fellow at the Institute for International Policy Studies, Yomiuri Research Institute in Tokyo, not only took the time to meet with me in Tokyo to discuss my thesis topic, but also reviewed two versions of my thesis and provided many helpful comments and insights. I am greatly indebted to him for taking the time to share his extensive insight and experience with me.

Mr. Rod Tanaka of the mutual defense assistance office at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo provided me with several points of contact that proved to be very useful for my research. He introduced me to Commander Thomas Murphy, also at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. Although we only met for a short time, Commander Murphy shared the depth of his experience with me and provided me with invaluable insight into my research. Mr. Tanaka also arranged for me to meet with senior members of the Japan Defense Research Center in Tokyo on two occasions, October 1999 and January 2000. I met several senior retired and active duty Japan Self Defense Force officers for lengthy round-table discussions concerning my topic on both occasions. These meetings proved invaluable for me in understanding the Japanese perspective of the U.S.-Japan security relationship.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. THESIS QUESTION

The importance of nuclear weapons for U.S. and allied strategy has diminished in recent years. How has this trend affected the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent extended to Japan, and what level of credibility is appropriate now to help maintain the alliance? These questions are the focus of this thesis. If U.S. credibility is weak, the Japanese may be compelled to seek nuclear protection from another power, claim neutrality, or seek independent nuclear forces. If it is too strong, they may become alienated from the alliance or fear entanglement in a U.S. precipitated nuclear conflict. Any of these scenarios would weaken the U.S.-Japan alliance or cause it to collapse, encouraging nuclear proliferation and threatening regional stability.

B. BACKGROUND

The role that nuclear weapons play in U.S. strategy has changed since the end of the Cold War. The perceived threat of large-scale nuclear warfare involving the United States and its allies has diminished following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Additionally, the United States is reducing its nuclear stockpile as part of nuclear arms control agreements with Russia.¹ As a consequence, nuclear weapons play a reduced role in U.S. strategy.

¹ See appendix A for current and projected U.S. strategic nuclear force levels based on Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) with the Soviet Union. The United States is reducing to START II levels and assisting the Russians to do so as well. U.S. declarations to move toward START III levels have been made but depend upon progress of START II reductions, Russian reactions to U.S. and allied missile defenses, and ongoing negotiations.

A revolution in military affairs (RMA) might be occurring because of advances in conventional weaponry and the application of information technologies to the conduct of warfare. The United States is on the leading edge of this potential RMA as Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and more recent operations in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans demonstrate. The United States can accomplish military tasks with conventional weapons more effectively and efficiently than before because of these advances in conventional capabilities. As a result, the role of conventional weapons in U.S. strategy has expanded, while the need to rely on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to achieve military objectives is diminished.²

Although the prospect of large-scale nuclear war seems less now than it did during the Cold War, today more nations are acquiring nuclear weapons or the technologies to produce them. The United States expanded its efforts in the 1990s to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons and support the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Setting the example by decreasing nuclear stockpiles and downplaying the importance of nuclear weapons are some ways the U.S. administration has tried to do this.³ The proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia combined with

² For a more complete discussion see Colin S. Gray, "Nuclear Weapons and the Revolution in Military Affairs," in T.V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett, and James J. Wirtz, et al., *The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1998) 99-134.

³ See "Decisions and Resolutions Adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament," in Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. McDonough with Toby F. Dalton and Gregory D. Koblentz, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998) 278.

the failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in October 1999, however, have frustrated efforts in this direction.⁴

Ballistic missiles and the technologies to produce them also are spreading. Countries such as North Korea that are hostile to the United States and its allies may soon possess missiles that are capable of intercontinental ranges with nuclear payloads.⁵ The United States is conducting research and development of national and theater missile defenses to help protect itself and its allies from these threats. The intent to develop missile defenses is consistent with U.S. efforts to rely less on nuclear deterrence.⁶ These changes to U.S. strategy affect the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent extended to allies. Reduced capabilities and apparent efforts to rely less upon nuclear deterrence create uncertainty about U.S. intentions.⁷

⁴ Concerning U.S. policy toward South Asian nuclearization see Robert M. Hathaway, "Fresh Start or Shameful Retreat in South Asia?" *Christian Science Monitor*, editorial/opinion section, 15 December 1999; Strobe Talbott, "Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 78, Number 2 (March/April 1999) 110-122. For a discussion on the CTBT vote in the U.S. Senate see Mary-Wynne Ashford and Peter Zheutlin, "Test Ban and Credibility," *Christian Science Monitor*, opinion/editorial section, 18 October 1999.

⁵ See Michael Richardson, "Tough Threat on Missiles: U.S. and Two Allies Warn North Korea of Sanctions," *Christian Science Monitor*, news section, 28 July 1999. See also Rodney Jones, 147-160, 256, 264.

⁶ Advocates of ballistic missile defenses argue that the ABM treaty was signed during an era when the United States and the Soviet Union followed a strategy of mutual assured destruction (MAD) that encouraged large nuclear arsenals and a strategic balance. Now that MAD is no longer applied, and the large nuclear arsenals are being reduced, there is no strategic balance for missile defenses to upset. For further discussion see Michael O'Hanlon, "Star Wars Strikes Back: Can Missile Defense Work This Time?" *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 78, Number 6 (November/December 1999): 71.

⁷ Nuclear strategy may change when nuclear capabilities/arsenals are reduced because the number of targets is also reduced. If the number of targets becomes relatively small, the strategy may need to shift from counterforce to countervalue to preserve a credible deterrent effect. As the United States reduces its nuclear arsenal, allies and adversaries alike may become uncertain of the direction of U.S. strategy, criteria for targeting, and intentions for the use of nuclear weapons. For a more detailed explanation see George H. Quester, "The Continuing Debate on Minimal Deterrence," in T. V. Paul, Richard Harknett, and James Wirtz, 174.

During most of the Cold War the Japanese believed the United States communicated clearly to its allies and to the Soviet Union how and why it would employ nuclear weapons. This clarity increased the credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence because allies and adversaries alike understood U.S. intentions and believed its threats to a high degree. Now it is not clear when the United States would employ nuclear weapons. The United States probably will respond to a nuclear attack against it or Japan with nuclear weapons, but the certainty of this is less now than it was during the Cold War. According to Yasuhiro Matsuda, senior research fellow at the Japan Defense Agency National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo, "many Japanese defense experts expect that the United States would respond to a nuclear attack against Japan or U.S. forces based in Japan with nuclear weapons." He believes, however, "that there are growing suspicions among Japanese politicians and civilians that the United States might not respond to such an attack with nuclear weapons."⁸ It is now possible that the United States could respond to a small-scale nuclear attack with overwhelming conventional counterforce attacks to destroy an aggressor's remaining nuclear forces, especially if those forces are few and not well protected. Captain Jeffrey W. Crews, senior defense attache at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo contends that possible non-nuclear U.S. responses to nuclear attacks are now conceivable.⁹ It is also possible that the United States will want to respond to a small-scale nuclear attack with conventional forces to strengthen its moral position and the validity of the nonproliferation regime. Allies and aggressors alike may reach these

⁸ Interview with Yasuhiro Matsuda, senior research fellow, The Japan Defense Agency National Institute for Defense Studies, and visiting researcher at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, 25 January 2000. (All interviews cited in this thesis are with the permission of the interviewees).

⁹ Interview with Captain Jeffrey W. Crews, U.S. Navy, senior defense attache, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, 12 October 1999.

same conclusions, and this will affect their calculations about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. This is especially true in Northeast Asia where the United States continues to extend nuclear deterrence to Japan.

Japan does not participate in any collective security organizations, and it relies upon the U.S. nuclear guarantee.¹⁰ The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty does not obligate Japan to contribute to the defense of the United States, but it does require the United States to assist in the defense of Japan. This is in contrast to NATO, a collective defense organization where all members are required to assist in the defense of each of the other members, and an organization where three of its members are declared nuclear weapons powers (the United States, Great Britain, and France). Furthermore, Japan is located in close proximity to North Korea, a country that is hostile to Japan that is suspected of possessing nuclear weapons, and two non-NATO declared nuclear weapons powers (China and Russia).¹¹ Japan is more dependent upon the U.S. nuclear guarantee than U.S. NATO allies.

Two security challenges in Northeast Asia could involve the U.S.-Japan alliance and the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: conflict on the Korean peninsula and the possibility of conflict between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan. Mike Mochizuki points to these two scenarios as the "greatest security challenges in the

¹⁰ According to Japan's *National Defense Program Outline*, Section III, Article (1), "Against the threat of nuclear weapons, [Japan will] rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent..." See also Morton H. Halperin, Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. State Department, "The Nuclear Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Relationship," The Nautilus Institute, East Asian Nuclear Policy Paper, 09 July 1999. Available [Online]: <<http://nautilus.org/nukepolicy/Halperin/index.html>> [16 September 1999].

¹¹ Morten Halperin explains that the Northeast Asian region is an area of potential conflict between three nuclear powers: the United States, Russia, and China, all of which have significant interests and military presence in the region. See Morten Halperin, "The Nuclear Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Relationship."

region.”¹² The United States and Japan could possibly become involved in a crisis on the Korean peninsula. The North Korean regime is isolated and unpredictable, and if conflict erupts on the peninsula it might threaten to use nuclear weapons to ensure its survival. The North Koreans have been pursuing nuclear weapons for almost twenty years, they have an extensive nuclear weapons production infrastructure, they are believed to possess enough weapons grade plutonium for several bombs, and they have the means to deliver warheads to all of Japan and portions of the United States with ballistic missiles.¹³ If U.S. and North Korean forces clash, the United States would rely on Japan for support in accordance with their security treaty and defense guidelines. Japanese support, however, is not certain. According to Joseph R. Donovan, chief of the political-military affairs section at the U.S. embassy in Tokyo, “there is nothing automatic about Japanese assistance to the United States under the *Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation*.¹⁴ Japanese support for U.S. forces involving contingencies in areas surrounding Japan would require the approval of the Government of Japan (GOJ) on a case-by-case basis. North Korea could possibly threaten to use nuclear weapons against Japan to prevent this support, or against U.S. forces based in Japan. According to Dean Wilkening and Kenneth Watman, “North Korea might threaten to attack Tokyo if Japan joined a U.S.-led coalition; if Japan did not remain neutral in the conflict and instead

¹² Mike M. Mochizuki, ed., *Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1997) 60.

¹³ See Appendix E (North Korea Nuclear Infrastructure). See also Ralph A. Cossa, “North Korea: Choosing Cooperation or Isolation,” *International Herald Tribune*, opinion section, 29 July 1999.

¹⁴ Interview with Joseph R. Donovan, Jr., chief, political-military affairs section, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, 19 January 2000.

allowed U.S. forces to stage out of Japanese airfields and ports..."¹⁵ Under these conditions, credible nuclear deterrence for Japan would become very important to prevent North Korean nuclear blackmail.¹⁶

The PRC/Taiwan dispute is the second scenario that could involve the U.S.-Japan alliance and nuclear weapons.¹⁷ If the PRC conducts an unprovoked attack against Taiwan, the United States may intervene. The United States would rely on Japanese support under their security treaty and defense guidelines if this occurs on the grounds that a PRC attack on Taiwan constitutes a threat to "the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East..."¹⁸ In the event of this, the Japanese would have to consider whether or not to provide support to the United States. According to several members of the Japan Foreign Ministry, U.S.-Japan treaty section, the Chinese would most likely put strong pressure on Japan to avoid supporting U.S. forces in such a scenario.¹⁹ Given the seriousness with which the PRC views the situation with Taiwan, and assuming that the PRC does not enjoy success with conventional forces, the Chinese could use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against

¹⁵ Dean Wilkening and Kenneth Watman, *Nuclear Deterrence in a Regional Context* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995) 35.

¹⁶ See Doug Bandow, *Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World* (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 1996) 121; and Shawn W. Crispin and Shim Jae Hoon, "Buying Time," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Volume 162, Number 13, 01 April 1999: 19.

¹⁷ "China Won't Use Nukes Vs. Taiwan," *The New York Times*, interactive edition, 02 September 1999. Available [Online]: <<http://www.nyt.com>> [02 September 1999].

¹⁸ Article VI, *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States*, 23 June 1960.

¹⁹ Interview with members of the Japan Foreign Ministry, Tokyo, 18 January 2000. These three members of the U.S.-Japan treaty section agreed to be interviewed on condition of anonymity.

Japan or U.S. forces based in Japan as a last resort to prevent Japan from cooperating with the United States.

C. THEORY

I will estimate the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee for Japan and its effect on the alliance by applying nuclear deterrence and alliance politics theories. First, I will use nuclear deterrence theory as explained by Dean Wilkening and Kenneth Watman in their 1995 RAND publication entitled *Nuclear Deterrence in a Regional Context*.²⁰ Their theory includes the basic components of nuclear deterrence credibility. Second, I will use theories explained by Stephan M. Walt and Glenn H. Snyder that describe why alliances may dissolve or strengthen.

Wilkening and Watman explain that the basic components of nuclear deterrence credibility are commitment and capability. They state that credibility depends on whether an adversary believes the deterrer is *committed* to do what he says he will do, and on the adversary's assessment of whether the deterrer is *capable* of doing what he says he will do. Commitment consists of a deterrer's interests and reputation. The adversary's belief in the deterrer's commitment to defend its interests in the future will be strong if the deterrer has important interests at stake, and if the deterrer has had a strong reputation for defending its interests in the past. Wilkening and Watman also point out that two lesser factors, bargaining tactics and legitimacy, affect an adversary's perception of a deterrer's commitment to defend its interests.²¹ Bargaining tactics refer to the way in

²⁰ Dean Wilkening and Kenneth Watman, 10-21.

²¹ Ibid., 17. The authors refer here to Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966).

which a deterrer communicates its interests and threats to an adversary. For example, the tactics of stationing troops on an ally's territory, or signing a mutual defense treaty, communicate a deterrer's interests. Bargaining tactics may also include public declarations to defend an ally.

Legitimacy applies to the deterrer's interests and methods of defense. The adversary's belief that the deterrer is committed to defend its interests will weaken if the adversary does not perceive the deterrer's interests or methods of defense to be legitimate. This could include a situation where a deterrer defends a disputed territory against an adversary by threatening preemptive use of weapons of mass destruction. In the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the legitimacy of employing U.S. nuclear weapons is questionable because many Japanese do not view nuclear deterrence as a legitimate means of national defense.

A deterrer's credibility for defending a client will have an effect on the strength of that alliance. According to Stephen M. Walt, "an alliance will become more fragile if its members begin to doubt that the existing arrangements are sufficient to guarantee their security."²² These doubts will emerge if either allied capabilities or commitments become questionable. Glenn Snyder describes these doubts as fears of abandonment; fears that an ally will abandon its obligations to the other ally, or quit the alliance all together. The opposite of this is fear of entrapment. As capabilities or commitments are strengthened in response to fears of abandonment, fears of becoming entrapped by the ally in an undesirable or unnecessary conflict will increase. Snyder describes this unavoidable tradeoff between abandonment and entrapment as an "alliance security

²² Stephan M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," *Survival*, Volume 39, Number 1 (Spring 1997) 160.

dilemma.”²³ The goal for alliance managers then becomes finding an appropriate mix of commitment and capability so that an effective level of credibility can be maintained, and an optimal balance between fear of abandonment and fear of entrapment can be found. The purpose of this thesis is to find such a balance in the area of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence for Japan.

D. METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE OF THESIS

Chapter II, “Nuclear Weapons and the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” describes the role that nuclear weapons play in achieving U.S. regional objectives, how nuclear weapons have affected Japanese security policy, and how nuclear weapons influence the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Chapter III, “Perceptions of U.S. Credibility,” discusses perceptions of the credibility of U.S. guarantees to defend Japan with nuclear weapons based on Wilkening and Watman’s basic components of nuclear deterrence credibility.

Chapter IV, “The Effects of Credibility,” analyzes how credibility affects the accomplishment of the U.S. objectives of alliance maintenance and regional nuclear non-proliferation. The effects of decreasing, sustaining, and increasing U.S. commitment and capability to defend Japan with nuclear weapons are applied to four criteria based on these U.S. objectives. The results of this are reflected in Tables 1 and 2 to help determine which options best accomplish U.S. goals.

²³ Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997) 180-186. See also Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 151.

Chapter V, “Conclusions,” states the major findings of the thesis and offers recommendations for improving the credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence extended to Japan.

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II. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

A. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND U.S. REGIONAL OBJECTIVES

Despite the reduced role of nuclear weapons, they are still relevant to U.S. strategy.²⁴ They help to guarantee U.S. interests, deter conflict, strengthen alliances, and discourage nuclear proliferation. According to the *U.S. National Security Strategy for a New Century*, “nuclear weapons serve as a guarantee of our security commitments to allies and a disincentive to those who would contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons.”²⁵ The U.S. “Nuclear Posture Review” describes how nuclear weapons play an important role in a regional context:

[R]etaining the ability to deploy nuclear capabilities to meet various regional contingencies, continues to be an important means for deterring aggression, protecting and promoting U.S. interests, reassuring allies and friends, and preventing proliferation. Although nuclear capabilities are now a far smaller part of the routine U.S. international presence, they remain an important element in the array of capabilities that the United States can bring to bear, either independently or in concert with allies to deter war, or should deterrence fail, to defeat aggression. Thus, the United States continues to extend deterrence to U.S. allies and friends.²⁶

U.S. maintenance of a nuclear arsenal is one way the United States attracts and maintains allies. The fact that the United States is able and willing to extend its nuclear umbrella to

²⁴ For current U.S. nuclear force levels see appendix B.

²⁵ The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary, 05 January 2000). Available [Online]: <<http://www.usia.gov>> [12 February 2000]. See also William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, 2000*. Available [Online]: <<http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr2000/adr2000.pdf>> [12 February 2000]. According to this report, “nuclear forces are an essential element of U.S. security, serving as a hedge against an uncertain future and as a guarantee of U.S. commitments to allies.”

²⁶ “Nuclear Posture Review,” Available [Online]: <<http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr1995/adr95/npr.html>> [23 August 1999].

other countries is an incentive for nations to both align with the United States and avoid alliances with U.S. adversaries.

Preserving regional alliances is a key objective of U.S. strategy in East Asia.²⁷ The credibility of U.S. commitments to protect its allies affects this objective. Chances that U.S. allies will follow an independent security path, claim neutrality, or defect to another alliance increase as the credibility of U.S. commitments decrease. Extending nuclear deterrence to allies is an important part of demonstrating U.S. commitment. If deterrence guarantees are credible, allied security and alliance bonds are enhanced. If the guarantees are incredible, U.S. alliance bonds loosen. Stephan M. Walt explains that, “[a]n alliance may dissolve if its members begin to question whether their partners are genuinely committed to providing assistance. Here the question is one of will rather than capability...”²⁸ The credibility of U.S. commitment to use nuclear weapons in the defense of allies is an important part of U.S. alliance maintenance efforts.

Preserving the credibility of U.S. resolve to protect allies with the nuclear forces reinforces U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals. U.S. allies are less likely to pursue independent nuclear forces if they have a strong belief in U.S. resolve to employ nuclear weapons in their defense. In the words of Lawrence Freedman, “[n]uclear proliferation tends to be a consequence of the weakening of established alliance ties, in that it reflects an alternative to security guarantees from a major power.”²⁹ Likewise, adversaries of

²⁷ *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, 1998* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, 1998) 19-44.

²⁸ Stephan Walt, 160.

²⁹ Lawrence Freedman, “Nuclear Strategy and Asia,” *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Volume 5, Number 1 (Summer 1993): 43; and Matake Kamiya, “Japan, Nuclear Weapons, and the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” paper prepared for presentation at the “Washington Conference on U.S.-Japan Security

U.S. allies will have fewer reasons for seeking nuclear weapons if they believe that U.S. allies are not likely to seek nuclear weapons themselves.

Credible U.S. extended nuclear deterrence reduces the likelihood of nuclear conflict. An adversary will be less likely to resort to the threat of nuclear weapons use against a U.S. ally in a crisis or preemptively if its leaders believe that the United States is willing and able to respond with nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are still the best deterrent to nuclear attack.³⁰ If adversary leaders believe that the United States might respond to a nuclear strike with conventional counterattacks, the perceived risks associated with nuclear use against U.S. forces or allies may begin to appear “contestable,” or worth taking.³¹

Credible U.S. extended nuclear deterrence remains necessary while research and development of ballistic missile defenses continues. North Korean and Chinese reactions have been negative to U.S. and allied moves toward theater missile defense research and development efforts. They have made pronouncements that this may cause a new arms race, implying that they may be forced to rely more on their nuclear or missile

Relations,” Washington, D.C., 02 May 1996: 10. Available [Online]: <<http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/okazaki-inst/alliance-pro-eng/kamiya.e.html>> [26 January 1999].

³⁰ See Wade Huntley, “Nuclear Deterrence in Northeast Asia,” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, Berkeley, California: 12. Available [Online]: <<http://focusbeb.org/focus/announce/huntley.html>> [26 January 1999].

³¹ Richard Harknett compares the contestable nature of conventional arms versus the uncontested nature of nuclear weapons. Concerning conventional weapons, he explains that, “It is the expectation that the destructive potential of one’s enemy can be contested that makes the gamble of war worth taking.” Concerning nuclear weapons Richard Harknett writes, “The uncontested nature of nuclear weapons creates an environment that affects state security relations in a manner distinguishable from pre-nuclear security dynamics.” See Richard J. Harknett, “State Preferences, Systemic Constraints, and the Absolute Weapon,” in T.V. Paul, Richard Harknett, and James Wirtz, 51-53.

deterrents.³² The United States must maintain a credible deterrent to counter these threats now because missile defenses are not yet deployed.

B. JAPAN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

It is difficult for the United States to extend nuclear deterrence to Japan. The United States and Japan have very different views concerning nuclear weapons. The United States is the only country to have ever attacked another with nuclear weapons, and Japan was the target. This stark reality affects the strategic cultures of both nations and has affected the U.S.-Japan alliance in many ways.

1. Japan's Nuclear Allergy

A consensus among some Japanese is opposed to all aspects of war, especially to nuclear weapons. Japanese antinuclear pacifism has its roots in the first half of the 20th century. Japan's political system moved away from emerging democracy to totalitarianism in the 1930s. Japan's militarist leaders then pursued expansionist policies throughout East and Southeast Asia. This brought Japan into conflict with the Allied powers, resulting in the Pacific War. Finally Japan faced total defeat, culminating with nuclear attacks by the United States in August 1945. Japan was devastated by the war and many Japanese view this time as the worst period in their long history as a nation.

³² "North Korea Blasts Clinton," *United Press International*, 15 January 2000; see also "China Opposes Attempts to Develop TMD," *Xinhua News Agency*, 18 November 1999. Both articles available [Online]: <www.northernlight.com> [14 February 2000].

Some Japanese believe that militarism leads to war, and war leads to national catastrophe. According to James Fallows writing for *The Atlantic Monthly* in 1989:

Japan seems unanimously and permanently convinced that the war led to catastrophe for the country. Moreover, the prevalent view in Japan is that the war was caused by a clique of semi-crazed militarists, who seized control of the country and forced everyone else into what was clearly a suicidal undertaking.³³

There is still a strong belief in Japan, especially at regional and local levels, that wars occur because military people prepare for war. If a nation did not have military forces, no other country would need to fight it, and war would be avoided. Furthermore, there does not appear to be a common understanding of nuclear deterrence in Japan. According to Lieutenant Colonel David Hunter-Chester of Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan, "there is no consensus in Japan about the advantages or disadvantages of nuclear deterrence. There is only a consensus that nuclear weapons are bad."³⁴ The issue of war is still so distasteful for many Japanese, that the subject is not openly discussed in most public forums for fear of offending people. Recently however, there has been some increase in open discussions of security issues, especially since North Korea launched an intermediate range ballistic missile over Japan in August 1998.³⁵

The Japanese perspective of nuclear weapons is unique. The experience of being the only nation to have been attacked by nuclear weapons leads some Japanese to believe

³³ James Fallows, "Japan: Let Them Defend Themselves," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Volume 263, Number 4 (April 1989): 22.

³⁴ According to Lieutenant Colonel Hunter-Chester of HQ, U.S. Forces Japan, a consensus concerning nuclear weapons has not formed due to the continued taboo of discussing nuclear weapons in Japan, and real debate does not occur concerning nuclear deterrence in public forums. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel David Hunter-Chester, U.S. Army, assistant director, plans and policy, headquarters, J5, U.S. Forces Japan, Yokota AFB, Japan, 20 January 2000.

³⁵ Interview with Hideshi Takesada, professor at the Japan Defense Agency National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, 14 January 2000.

that nuclear destruction is the consequence of militarism and modern war.³⁶ At a press conference in Tokyo in 1981, Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki stated that, "Since the Japanese people are the only people in the world who have ever suffered from the effects of the atom bombs, they have a particular aversion to nuclear arms."³⁷ This aversion to nuclear arms is commonly referred to as Japan's nuclear allergy. Because of its nuclear allergy, Japan has evolved into a pacifist nation and it has developed a pacifist security policy. Japanese policy reflects a belief in peace and protection through avoidance of conflict.³⁸ This is in contrast to U.S. security practices. The United States sees the use of force as a legitimate instrument of statecraft, and uses force to protect its interests as required. A strong military and the will to use force prevent conflict because adversaries will be deterred from challenging the United States. This reflects the American belief in peace through strength.

Japanese antinuclear sentiment is reflected in the language Japanese leaders use when describing their pacifist policies of conflict avoidance. For example, during an

³⁶ Laura Hein and Mark Selden explain that during the conduct of the International Military Tribunals Japanese leaders were convicted of so many crimes that this "reinforced the view that Japanese military leaders were responsible for the atomic bomb tragedy." See Laura Hein and Mark Selden, *Living with the Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear Age* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp, Inc., 1997) 174.

³⁷ From the "Japanese Premier's Discussion of Defense Issues," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, The Far East, 10 June 1981: 3. Available [Online]: LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: News. File: Allnews [28 May 1999].

³⁸ Andrew Mack states that "Japan's pacifism is inward-looking and tries to shield the nation from external threat by avoiding security entanglements as much as possible." See Andrew Mack, ed., *Nuclear Policies in Northeast Asia* (New York: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1995) 80; also "The United States and Japan in 1994: Uncertain Prospects," Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Available [Online]: <<http://www.gwjapan.com>> [22 May 1999].

address to the United Nations General Assembly on 27 September 1994, Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono stated that:

Japan does not, nor will it, resort to the use of force, which is prohibited by its constitution. Japan will remain resolutely a nation of peace. As the only country to have suffered a nuclear attack, and adhering firmly to its three non-nuclear principles, Japan strives to achieve the ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons.³⁹

Part of Japan's identity is the fact that they are the only nation to have ever experienced nuclear attack by the United States, and this lends tremendous credibility to Japanese arguments against nuclear weapons specifically and modern war in general. It also contributes to the difficulty of extending U.S. nuclear deterrence to Japan.

2. The 1960 Security Treaty Revision

The 1960 revision of the U.S.-Japan security treaty caused serious strains in the alliance, and serves as an example of how nuclear weapons have influenced Japanese security policy and the U.S.-Japan alliance. The Prime Minister at the time, Nobusuke Kishi, was considered reactionary, confrontational, and unpopular among the Japanese people. He had been part of Tojo's Imperial cabinet and had been purged by U.S. occupation forces after the War. According to Walter LaFeber, there was a "growing fear that Kishi - who had systematically tried to slash the rights of workers and civil servants - might try to use the military and police to impose a despotic regime."⁴⁰ He was

³⁹ Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister's Major Speeches and Articles, 49th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 27 September 1994. Available [Online]: <http://www.gwjapan.com> [28 February 2000].

⁴⁰ Walter LaFeber, *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997) 321; and John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation*, rev. version. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989) 849-50.

considered pro-business and anti-labor, and many Japanese feared he was turning back the democratic reforms Japan had gained since the end of the War.

During this period, confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union was escalating, and the specter of nuclear holocaust was growing larger in the minds of many Japanese. The Eisenhower administration had been moving forward with its "New Look" policy of massive retaliation to compensate for conventional force cutbacks. Concerning the prospect of a strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance, the Soviets publically warned Japan that it could get in the nuclear "line of fire."⁴¹

The political opposition to Kishi argued that the security relationship with the United States was entangling, and it would pull Japan into a U.S. precipitated conflict in East Asia. According to the proposed treaty revision, Japan would assist the United States in maintaining peace and stability in the "Far East." Kishi had defined the "Far East" in February of 1960 as the area north of the Philippines. This meant Japan could be obligated to assist the United States in fighting China over Taiwan, a prospect many Japanese did not view as in their interest.⁴²

This opposition to the Kishi government, combined with renewed fears of war as the result of an entangling alliance with the United States, culminated during a boycott of Diet deliberations concerning this treaty revision in May 1960 with Japan's largest antinuclear/antiwar protests in its history.⁴³ Protestors declared that these security treaty

⁴¹ Walter LaFeber, 320.

⁴² Ibid., 319.

⁴³ The peak of the opposition occurred during a boycott of Diet deliberations that occurred after PM Kishi forced the treaty revision through the lower house of the Diet around 15 May 1960 (so that the pact would take effect 30 days later even without the upper house's approval). The day that Michiko Kamba, a Tokyo University student, died in a crush of demonstrators was either the peak or close to the peak of the demonstrations, which continued until Kishi announced on 15 May 1960 the cancellation of

revisions would entangle Japan in an American war. This could also help to facilitate a return of militarism in Japan and threaten emerging Japanese democracy. Additionally, there was a fear that U.S. nuclear weapons stationed in Japan would make Japan a nuclear target for U.S. adversaries (i.e., the U.S.S.R.).⁴⁴ Given Japan's nuclear allergy, many Japanese viewed the closer security relationship with the United States as unacceptable.

These security treaty protests were organized by the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, the Socialist Party of Japan, and the General Council of Trade Unions. These three organizations joined forces to create the Peoples Congress to Block the Security Treaty Revision.⁴⁵ Despite the protests, the security treaty was passed, but the political fallout of this was so significant that it led to the resignation of Prime Minister Kishi.⁴⁶

Prior to his resignation, in response to the intense pressure from the opposition concerning entangling alliances, Kishi proclaimed that Japan's right to exercise collective self-defense as stated in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter is prohibited by Japan's

U.S. President Eisenhower's scheduled visit for 18-19 June to Tokyo. Correspondence with Sam Jameson, a reporter for the *Asian Business Magazine* and *Denver Post*, columnist for the *Sankei Shimbun*, and senior fellow at the Institute for International Policy Studies, Yomiuri Research Institute, Tokyo, <jameson@gol.com>. 07 February 2000. *Re: review of thesis outline.* [Email to author <dcrasmus@nps.navy.mil>].

⁴⁴ Edward A. Olsen states that "the Japanese people have long feared that their country is being used as a nuclear base by the United States despite reassurances to the contrary. They also fear becoming a Soviet target as a consequence of being covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella." See Edward A. Olsen, *U.S. Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A Neo-Internationalist View* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1985) 51.

⁴⁵ Eisei Ishikawa and David L. Swain, *Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1981) 580.

⁴⁶ William L. Scully and Guy M. Hicks, "Japanese Defense Policy," *Heritage Foundation Reports*, Number 141, 06 May 1981. Available [Online]: LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: News. File: Allnews [28 May 1999].

constitution. The Japanese government has clarified the principle of no collective self-defense by affirming that “the constitution limits Japan’s right to use force to the minimal extent necessary to defend the nation...”⁴⁷ The Japanese government has maintained this interpretation of its constitution to avoid becoming entangled in conflicts involving the defense of the United States, or U.S. interests not directly tied to the defense of the Japanese homeland, such as Vietnam or the Gulf War conflict.

3. Japan’s Three Non-nuclear Principles

Japan’s three non-nuclear principles state that Japan will not produce, possess, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. Prime Minister Sato submitted these principles to the Diet in 1967 and they were adopted in 1971. These principles were drafted because of growing public pressure on the government to avoid becoming involved in U.S. conflicts where nuclear weapons could be used. According to Laura Hein and Mark Selden, “[w]hen the danger grew more pressing that atomic weapons might be used again during the Vietnam War, the Japanese government passed the three non-nuclear principles.”⁴⁸ These principles were also adopted in response to public opposition to ongoing negotiations between the United States and Japan over the return of Okinawa. There was strong domestic Japanese concern that U.S. nuclear weapons would remain on Okinawa even after it was turned over to Japan.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Mike Mochizuki, 31.

⁴⁸ Laura Hein and Mark Seldon, 70.

⁴⁹ Hans Kristensen of the Nautilus Institute explains that when negotiations over the return of Okinawa stalled, and the prospect of continued presence of nuclear weapons on the island increased, Prime Minister Sato proposed the three non-nuclear principles to help ease anti-nuclear opposition political pressure. See Hans Kristensen, “Japan Under the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella,” The Nautilus Institute, East

These principles are not written into Japanese law, but because of Japan's nuclear allergy, many Japanese consider these to be Japan's "irrevocable" policy.⁵⁰ Despite the fact that some on the extreme right promote a nuclear-armed Japan, a majority of Japanese are adamant about adhering to these principles. According to Tsuneo Akaha, "the non-nuclear principles have been supported by a national consensus from which the government cannot deviate without risking a major political turmoil."⁵¹

The three non-nuclear principles represent a barrier to militarism and war. As reflected in this following excerpt from a 1994 editorial statement in the *Asahi Shimbun*, the non-nuclear principles combine with the "Peace" constitution serve as protection against the abuses of war: "After the end of the last war, we have not injured or murdered peoples of other countries by the will of the state, and gone our own way, keeping in mind the provisions of the Constitution and adopting the three non-nuclear principles."⁵²

The three non-nuclear principles have not been altered since they were adopted almost thirty years ago. Many Japanese believe that the third principle of not introducing nuclear weapons into Japan, however, has been routinely violated by the United States. They believe that U.S. military forces brought nuclear weapons into Japan on warships

Asian Nuclear Policy Paper, 20 July 1999. Available [Online]: <<http://www.nautilus.org>> [08 August 1999].

⁵⁰ Laura Hein and Mark Seldon, 70.

⁵¹ Tsuneo Akaha, "Japan's Three Non-nuclear Principles: A Coming Demise?", *Peace and Change*, Volume 11, Number 1 (Spring 1985): 75. According to Kumao Kaneko, "This feeling-often referred to as a 'nuclear allergy'-is so widespread and deep-rooted in Japanese minds that it seems inconceivable to the average Japanese that Japan should ever go nuclear.... Any politician who even hinted at nuclear armament would be defeated in popular elections." See Kumao Kaneko, "Japan Needs No Umbrella: Instead Japan Should Take the Lead in Establishing a Nuclear-Free-Zone," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Volume 52, Number 2 (March 1996): 46.

⁵² "Postwar Years; What do Readers Think?" *Asahi Shimbun*, opinion section, 02 May 1994. Available [Online]: LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: News. File: Allnews [28 May 1999].

and military aircraft. Suspected U.S. violation of the third principle has caused controversy in Japan, and has helped keep alive the Japanese antinuclear and pacifist sentiment.⁵³

Former U.S. ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer revealed during a one-on-one interview with a reporter from the *Mainichi Shimbun* in 1981 that it was "common knowledge" among U.S. and Japanese officials that U.S. warships carrying nuclear weapons transited Japanese waters and made port calls in Japanese cities.⁵⁴ He called it an "open secret."⁵⁵ His comments created an uproar. Apparently not everyone in Japan understood this to be accepted policy. In fact, most Japanese were shocked that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government approved of this despite the three non-nuclear principles. However, the LDP attempted to deny knowledge of U.S. violations, and took measures to increase the perception of its support for these principles.⁵⁶

⁵³ "U.S. government documents recently declassified under the Freedom of Information Act and obtained through this author's [Hans Kristiensen's] research add substantial weight to previous assertions that the United States routinely brought nuclear weapons into Japan during the Cold War despite Japan's non-nuclear policy." See Hans Kristiensen.

⁵⁴ Correspondence with Sam Jameson of the Yomiuri Research Institute, <jameson@gol.com> 07 February 2000. *Re: review of thesis outline.* [Email to author <dcrasmus@nps.navy.mil>].

⁵⁵ Hans Kristiensen explains that U.S. nuclear weapons came in and out of Japanese ports easily under the U.S. policy of "neither confirm nor deny." According to this, "it is the policy of the United States Government concerning any public statements on [foreign government queries about nuclear weapons in their country] neither to confirm nor deny the presence of the nuclear component of nuclear capable weapons in any other country, and that this policy would be followed in the event that U.S. officials are queried with respect to any statement made by an official of a foreign country or by any other source." Kristiensen's source of this information is the "Approved minutes, meeting of 02 January 1958, Room 5100, New State Building," Operations Coordinating Board, Washington, D.C., 08 January 1958." Partially declassified and released under FOIA. See Hans Kristiensen. Also see Edward A. Olsen, 25.

⁵⁶ Hans Kristiensen states that "[a]ny indication that nuclear weapons were present on a ship or aircraft on Japanese territory would be immensely costly for the Japanese government and probably even cause it to fall." See Hans Kristiensen.

As a result, Prime Minister Suzuki reaffirmed the government's pledge to the non-nuclear principles in a press conference in Tokyo on June 8, 1981:

It is my understanding that the three non-nuclear principles form what we call a national policy. In other words, they are a basic policy which is supported by the majority of the people. Therefore, the Suzuki Cabinet will continue – in the future, as in the past – to abide by the three non-nuclear principles.⁵⁷

The three non-nuclear principles are firmly established in Japan. Most foreigners, and even some Japanese, believe these to be part of Japan's constitution. In fact they are not, and there are some Japanese who are quick to remind foreigners that Japan has the sovereign right to pursue nuclear weapons if they choose to without violating their "Peace" constitution.⁵⁸

Distrust of U.S. adherence to the third non-nuclear principle has caused concern among many Japanese for a long time.⁵⁹ The Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) put pressure on the ruling LDP for a long time to confirm that U.S. warships visiting Japan were

⁵⁷ "Japanese Premier's Discussion of Defense Issues, 1981."

⁵⁸ Naruhiko Ueda of the Japan Defense Research Center pointed out that possession of nuclear weapons would not violate Japan's 1947 Constitution, and that Japan does not need to seek permission from the United States to do so. He was making a point about Japanese sovereignty, and was not advocating Japanese nuclear weapons. Interview with Dr. Naruhiko Ueda, Lieutenant General (retired), Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces, senior executive director, Japan Defense Research Center, Tokyo, 12 January 2000. Commander Thomas Murphy of the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo explained that he has been frequently reminded by Japanese Self-Defense Force officers that Japan's constitution does not prohibit the right to possess nuclear weapons. Commander Murphy did not imply that these officers advocated Japanese nuclear weapons, just that they were aware that Japan has the sovereign right to do so if they choose. Interview with Commander Thomas Murphy, mutual defense assistance office, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, 19 January 2000.

⁵⁹ Janice Fuhrman states that "as the only country in history to have suffered a nuclear attack, Japan has maintained a firm postwar prohibition against nuclear weapons on its soil, in its air or in its waters....But many Japanese feel the same nation that dropped atomic bombs on the western port cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 – the United States – is threatening the anti-nuclear policy it encouraged Japan to adopt....The non-nuclear weapons policy strikes a deep emotional chord in the Japanese people, the result of their niche in history as the only country to endure a nuclear attack." Janice Fuhrman, "Japanese fear Washington Undermining Nuclear Pact," *British Broadcasting Corporation Summary of World Broadcasts*, international section, 08 November 1987. Available [Online]: LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: News. File: Allnews [28 May 1999].

indeed nuclear-free. The Japanese government indicated on several occasions that it “trusted” the United States to observe Japan’s non-nuclear principles because the United States was a good and important ally. This is in contrast to New Zealand’s strict enforcement of its non-nuclear principles, barring U.S. atomic powered and nuclear-armed naval vessels from entering its ports. This caused a split in the alliance between the United States and New Zealand in 1985, and has called attention to Japan’s apparent unwillingness to resist U.S. pressure and enforce its non-nuclear principles.⁶⁰

Even today in Japan active opposition to suspected U.S. violations of the third non-nuclear principle continues. On February 23, 1999 the Kochi prefectoral governor introduced a bill to his prefectoral assembly requiring foreign warships to verify they were nuclear-free before entering Kochi ports. The bill required the governor to ask the Foreign Ministry to submit documents proving that visiting warships are not carrying nuclear weapons. The Kochi prefectoral governor, Daijiro Hashimoto, stated in an interview with the *Asahi Shimbun* on March 12, 1999, “I want the Foreign Ministry to show local governments that Japan is adhering to its three non-nuclear principles.”⁶¹

The three non-nuclear principles are the centerpiece of Japan’s antinuclear pacifism and are as relevant to understanding the Japanese view of nuclear weapons today as they were in 1967 when they were first introduced. Recognized as “irrevocable

⁶⁰ For more detailed information see Ted Galen Carpenter, “Pursuing A Strategic Divorce: The U.S. and the ANZUS Alliance,” Policy Analysis Number 67, The CATO Institute, 27 February 1986. Available [Online]: <<http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa067.html>> [28 February 2000].

⁶¹ “Kochi to Abandon No-nuke Bill,” *Asahi News Service*, 12 March 1999. Available [Online]: LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: News. File: Allnews [28 May 1999]. See also Greg Wiegand, “Nuclear-free Prefecture Proposed,” *South China Morning Post*, issue 2533, 25 February 1999. Available [Online]: <<http://www.northernlight.com>> [29 February 2000].

national policy" by successive prime ministers and national leaders, the three non-nuclear principles reflect Japanese identity as a pacifist nation.

Although Japan continues to have a pacifist security policy and maintains its three non-nuclear principles, there has been some recent loosening of the defense debate in Japan.⁶² There has been a taboo against leaders and policy-makers openly discussing defense or military issues. Defense issues are very unpopular and simply talking about the subject may cause a Japanese politician to be labeled as extreme. This taboo may be declining, however. There appears to be growing acceptance of the far right wing position to make Japan a more "normal" country: a country that participates in collective self-defense organizations and employs military force as a legitimate instrument of statecraft. Several factors have recently contributed to the strengthening of the far right wing position on security matters. First, since the end of the Cold War, there has been a general decline in the influence of the left wing. Takashi Kawakami of the Japan Defense Agency National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo explained that, "the voice of the left has become weak and this may present the best opportunity to amend the constitution for those who want to make Japan a "normal" country."⁶³ Secondly, there are growing concerns in Japan about the commitment of the United States to the region given the continued existence of a significant North Korean threat, and the continued growth of China as a regional power. These factors have helped to loosen the defense

⁶² According to Commander Murphy, the Japanese left-wing opposition has weakened in recent years, and the Government of Japan (GOJ) is more capable of deflecting domestic criticisms about suspected past U.S. violations of the third non-nuclear principle. This does not suggest that the GOJ will abandon its three non-nuclear principles, but that the taboo surrounding nuclear weapons may be weakening along with the political left in Japan. Interview with Commander Thomas Murphy of the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo.

⁶³ Interview with Takashi Kawakami, professor at the Japan Defense Agency National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, 13 October 1999.

debate in Japan and some are using it as an opportunity to advance their agenda for security policy reform. This has caused regional concerns (i.e., China and Korea) that Japan is moving to the right and will “remilitarize.”⁶⁴ Masashi Nishihara, professor of international relations at the Japan National Defense Academy argues, however, that “Japan is not moving to the right, it is merely becoming healthy.”⁶⁵ In short, the willingness of Japanese politicians and policy-makers to openly discuss security concerns is slowly increasing in Japan despite the continued existence of deep-rooted antinuclear and pacifist sentiments.

4. Japan and U.S. Nuclear Strategy

The U.S. nuclear umbrella is a Japanese compromise between the need for nuclear deterrence and a strong national antinuclear pacifism that keeps Japan’s three non-nuclear principles firmly in place.⁶⁶ To the extent that the U.S. nuclear deterrent for Japan is credible, this compromise can be maintained. U.S. nuclear deterrence extended to Japan is thus the bridge between Japan’s need for nuclear protection and its aversion to nuclear arms.

The United States maintains a de facto “no first use” nuclear deterrent strategy for the defense of Japan. This was true even during the Cold War period. The United States maintained a nuclear first use strategy against Warsaw Pact forces as part of the

⁶⁴ Susan V. Lawrence, “Prickly Pair: China and Japan Remain Civil-and Deeply Divided,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Volume 162, Number 28, 22 July 1999: 20.

⁶⁵ Interview with Masashi Nishihara, director of the Japan National Defense Academy School of Social Sciences and Graduate School for Security Studies, Yokosuka, Japan, 17 January 2000; interview with Dr. Naruhiko Ueda of the Japan Defense Research Center.

⁶⁶ Selig S. Harrison, *Japan’s Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996) 10.

continental defense of Western Europe to compensate for NATO's relative lack of conventional forces. This was also true for the defense of South Korea against a superior North Korean conventional threat. However, threats of a rapid and massive invasion similar to what is possible in Europe or the Korean peninsula have never existed for Japan because it is an island nation.⁶⁷ Therefore, it was not necessary for the United States to threaten first use of nuclear weapons to defend Japan from conventional attacks. Additionally, first use of U.S. nuclear weapons, or use of nuclear weapons in response to anything other than a nuclear attack, would not be accepted by most Japanese under any circumstances. It would be unlikely that any Japanese government would support such U.S. action given Japan's antinuclear sentiment, and it could mean a rupture of the alliance.⁶⁸ In the opinion of Major Robert Hesse, U.S. Army, assistant director for plans and policy, J5, Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan, the GOJ could not support the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, and would probably have to adopt a neutral stance in a crisis situation involving the use or threat of use of U.S. nuclear weapons.⁶⁹ The United States would most likely employ nuclear weapons in the defense of Japan only in retaliation for a nuclear attack against it or U.S. forces based there despite U.S. pronouncements of maintaining a "first use" policy for U.S. nuclear forces worldwide. The United States might consider responding to chemical or biological attacks on Japan

⁶⁷ Shin'ichi Ogawa, senior research fellow, Japan Defense Agency National Institute for Defense Studies, "U.S. Nuclear Forces and Japanese/Western Pacific Security," in Patrick J. Garrity and Steven A. Maaranen, et al., *Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World: Perspectives from Europe, Asia, and North America* (New York: Plenum Press, 1992) 155.

⁶⁸ See Wade Huntley, 8

⁶⁹ Interview with Major Robert Hesse, U.S. Army, assistant director, plans and policy, J5, U.S. Forces Japan, Yokota AFB, Japan, 20 January 2000.

with nuclear weapons, but Japanese support for this course of action would not be certain, and could damage the alliance.

5. Conclusion

Nuclear weapons affect the U.S.-Japan alliance in many ways. The U.S. nuclear deterrent extended to Japan is problematic and differs from the nuclear deterrent the United States extends to other allies such as South Korea and those in NATO.⁷⁰ U.S. efforts to integrate Japan with it and South Korea in a trilateral security relationship may prove difficult because of the preexisting nuclear dimension of the U.S.-ROK alliance. It is difficult to discuss nuclear strategy and issues with the Japanese because of their nuclear allergy and sensitivity to the subject, and real Japanese support for U.S. nuclear policies is hard to gauge. According to Captain Crews, one of the significant obstacles to closer alliance ties is the inability to adequately discuss certain issues such as nuclear weapons with the Japanese.⁷¹

As discussed above, the strategy for nuclear use in the defense of Japan differs from that employed in defense of South Korea and NATO. However, this distinction is often misunderstood by both Americans and Japanese. Because the United States and its South Korean and NATO allies relied on a nuclear first-use policy to compensate for conventional weaknesses, nuclear forces are integrated into alliance warfighting plans. In

⁷⁰ For further discussion of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea see Patrick M. Morgan, "U.S. Extended Deterrence in East Asia," in Tong Whan Park, ed., *The U.S. and the Two Koreas: A New Triangle* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998) 43-74. For a discussion of U.S. nuclear strategy and NATO see David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998) 55-57; and Major Mark N. Gose, USAF, "The New Germany and Nuclear Weapons: Options for the Future," *Airpower Journal*, Volume 10, Special Edition (1996): 67-78.

the U.S.-Japan alliance, however, nuclear use is not considered or openly shared in allied plans for the defense of Japan, and all consideration of employing nuclear weapons would probably be considered only as a retaliatory measure in the context of an extreme crisis. U.S.-Japan allied ability to refer to preexisting plans based on likely scenarios to assist decision-makers with questions of nuclear use during a crisis does not exist as it does between the United States and its other allies. Therefore, any decision to employ U.S. nuclear weapons in defense of Japan would be highly political, and the consequences of such a decision could be extremely damaging to the alliance, whatever the outcome. In the case of South Korea and NATO, nuclear strategy has been integrated into these alliances and has been evolving for nearly 50 years. Decisions about when and how to employ nuclear weapons have already been decided to a large degree. Although any decision to use nuclear weapons would be a political decision, most options have already been considered and integrated into allied military plans. The consequences of such a decision for these alliances would therefore be less volatile than that between the U.S. and Japan, and those alliances would be more likely to survive the outcome. This affects the credibility of the deterrent. Lack of demonstrated allied concurrence or shared resolve to employ nuclear weapons detracts from the credibility of U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons and degrades the effectiveness of the deterrent. Potential adversaries may take advantage of these perceived weaknesses, especially during a nuclear crisis situation when the United States and Japan will be the least equipped to act in unison.

⁷¹ Interview with Captain Crews of the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, 11 January 2000. Also interview with Sam Jameson of the Yomiuri Research Institute, 19 January 2000.

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III. PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. CREDIBILITY

A. PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. COMMITMENT

Four factors influence perceptions of U.S. commitment to defend Japan with nuclear weapons: U.S. interests, reputation, bargaining tactics, and legitimacy. First, the United States has strong interests in helping to defend Japan by extending nuclear deterrence. One important U.S. interest is preservation of the U.S.-Japan alliance. However unlikely, the Japanese could seek neutrality or even protection from another regional nuclear weapons power (China or Russia) if they were not secure under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. This would mean an end to the U.S.-Japan alliance, which is the “linchpin” to U.S. strategy in East Asia.⁷² Additionally, a healthy U.S.-Japan alliance fosters economic ties between the two nations and encourages regional economic prosperity.

Second, the United States seeks to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If the U.S. nuclear commitment to the defense of Japan is perceived as weak or uncertain, regional suspicions that Japan might pursue nuclear weapons would increase. According to Dr. Andrew Kim, political-military advisor to the Commander of U.S. Army Japan, both Korean and Chinese suspicions of Japanese nuclear ambitions would rise if the U.S. commitment to defend Japan with nuclear weapons was perceived as weak.⁷³ This might provide adversaries with additional reasons for pursuing nuclear weapons themselves. In

⁷² See *Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, 19.

⁷³ Interview with Dr. Kim of U.S. Army Japan. Also, according to Masashi Nishihara, the current perceived level of U.S. commitment to defend Japan with nuclear weapons is sufficient to deter Japanese adversaries, but regional insecurity would increase if this U.S. commitment was perceived as weakening. Interview with Professor Masashi Nishihara of the Japan National Defense Academy.

the worst case, the Japanese could be forced to pursue the development of independent nuclear forces if they believed that they were not adequately protected by U.S. nuclear forces.⁷⁴ Michiko Nakamoto, a reporter for *The Financial Times of London*, quoted Taro Kono, a member of the Japanese Diet from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party as saying, “I doubt the U.S. president will push the button to protect Japan. I’m not sure if the nuclear umbrella is a good one or a leaky one.”⁷⁵ According to Hideshi Takesada of the Japan Defense Agency National Institute for Defense Studies, “nuclear arguments are beginning to emerge in Japan because of misperceptions that U.S. commitment to Japan is declining.”⁷⁶ If the Japanese move in this direction, it could compel other regional powers to do the same, and an East Asian nuclear arms race could develop. It is a vital U.S. interest to discourage another arms race in the region that might reduce stability and increase the likelihood of conflict.

The U.S. reputation of loyalty as an ally has not been perceived by the Japanese as consistent. In the 1980s, Americans became nervous about Japanese economic success and competition, and there was an increase in so-called “Japan-bashing.” Many

⁷⁴ The Japanese parliamentary vice minister for the Defense Agency, Shingo Nishimura, was fired in October for making statements that Japan should consider pursuing independent nuclear forces. See Robyn Lim, “Japan’s Best Bet Remains the American Nuclear Umbrella,” *International Herald Tribune*, opinion section, 29 October 1999.

⁷⁵ Michiyo Nakamoto, “Japan’s Tentative Military Advance,” *The Financial Times of London*, comment and analysis, 21 January 2000: 19.

⁷⁶ Hideshi Takesada believes that there is a misperception in Japan that the United States may choose its interests over Japan’s when dealing with North Korea because of the bilateral nature of U.S.-DPRK discussions and the Four-Party talks (United States, China, ROK, DPRK) that Japan is excluded from, and this is causing anxiety and concern about U.S. abandonment of certain obligations to Japan, including nuclear obligations. Interview with Professor Hideshi Takesada of the Japan National Institute for Defense Studies.

Americans viewed Japan as a threat to the United States.⁷⁷ American anti-Japanese feelings culminated in 1990-91 when Japanese leaders lacked the political support to contribute armed forces to the Gulf War coalition led by the United States.⁷⁸ Americans accused Japan of being a “free-riding” ally - an ally that would not contribute its fair share to the alliance.⁷⁹ The Japanese believe they were misunderstood and mistreated by the United States, especially given Japan’s significant financial contribution to the war effort.⁸⁰

There are suspicions in Japan that the United States does not view Japan as favorably as China. Lack of U.S. support for a Japanese seat as a permanent member on the United Nations security council with full veto powers sends a message to many Japanese that the United States does not consider Japan to be on an equal status with China.⁸¹ Additionally, the success of books such as *The Rape of Nanking* suggest to many Japanese that Americans really favor China over Japan.⁸²

⁷⁷ Masaru Tamamoto, “Japan’s Search for Recognition and Status,” in Warren S. Hunsberger, et al., *Japan’s Quest: The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997) 6-8.

⁷⁸ LaFeber, 285-289.

⁷⁹ According to Hisahiko Okazaki, “the [American] public at large naturally expects Japan, as America’s ally, to cooperate in full. We [the Japanese] live at all times with the danger that the trust that holds the Japan-U.S. alliance together will suddenly crumble because this expectation has been betrayed.” Hisahiko Okazaki, former Japanese Ambassador to Thailand and Saudi Arabia, “A National Strategy for the Twenty-first Century,” *Japan Echo*, Volume 26, Number 5 (October 1999): 10.

⁸⁰ Japan contributed a total of \$13 billion in cash and resources to the Gulf War coalition effort, and levied a special national tax for this purpose.

⁸¹ Sam Jameson talked about the lack of U.S. support for a Japanese U.N. security council seat with full veto powers as evidence many Japanese cite that the United States does not consider Japan on an equal status with China. Interview with Sam Jameson of the Yomiuri Research Institute.

⁸² Iris Chang’s book *The Rape of Nanking* that documents Japanese war atrocities in China during the Second World War has been a bestseller in the United States since 1997. Naruhiko Ueda believes this demonstrates that Americans actually favor China over Japan, and this is another example of Japan-bashing. Interview with Dr. Naruhiko Ueda of the Japan Defense Research Center. The book has not been published in Japan despite efforts by the author’s publisher, U.S.-based Basic Books. Tokyo has disputed

There are other reasons why some Japanese question U.S. commitment to the alliance. For example, a California state law was passed recently that extends the time limit for filing forced-labor lawsuits against foreign companies, and many U.S. veterans have sued Japanese corporations, such as Mitsubishi, for the abuses they suffered as forced-labor prisoners during World War II. Although the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Thomas Foley, said this law was not enforceable because the 1952 peace treaty officially ending the war between the United States and Japan disallows such claims, these lawsuits and the interest they have attracted are cited by some Japanese as evidence that anti-Japanese sentiment is strong in the United States.⁸³

The U.S. reputation as a credible ally suffered in 1996 during a territorial dispute between China and Japan over the small Senkaku (Japanese)/Diaoyu (Chinese) islands located between Okinawa and Taiwan. Both China and Japan claim ownership of the islands, and rights to fishing areas and oil reserves are disputed as a result. Questions of whether or not the United States would assist Japan in a conflict with China over the islands under the provisions of the U.S.-Japan security treaty were raised in 1996. U.S. Ambassador at the time, Walter Mondale, indicated that the United States did not have an official position on who owns the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and that the U.S.-Japan security treaty does not require the United States to intervene on behalf of Japan in a

the Chinese version of events, and the author would not agree to changes in the translation by the Japanese publisher Kashiwa-Shobo Publishing, so the contract was dropped. See Sally Fisher, "No Japan Deal on *Rape of Nanking*," *South China Morning Star*, Volume 13, Number 95, 21 May 1999. Available [Online]: <http://www.northernlight.com> [02 February 2000].

⁸³ The Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its concern about this issue. There is growing backlash in Japan to these lawsuits, and the Governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, in response asked whether Japan should be compensated by the United States for the atomic bombings. This dispute reinforces Japanese suspicions that there remains strong anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States. See Doug Struck and Kathryn Tolbert, "Envoy Rejects POW's claims against Japan. More than a dozen lawsuits have been filed after a change in California law," *Fort Worth Star-Telegram*, news section, 19 January 2000. Available [Online]: <http://www.northernlight.com> [02 February 2000].

dispute with China over these islands.⁸⁴ Many Japanese viewed this neutral U.S. position as either an inability or unwillingness of the United States to confront China, or a lack of commitment as a Japanese ally. In either case, the U.S. reputation suffered. Additionally, the Japanese are watching the U.S. commitment to Taiwan as an indicator of U.S influence vis-à-vis China and dependability as an ally.⁸⁵ There is a growing perception in Japan that the U.S. position in the region is declining relative to China, and this affects Japanese perceptions of the U.S. commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance.⁸⁶

The U.S. reputation in Japan is also diminished because of the continued existence of the North Korean nuclear infrastructure and ballistic missile programs.⁸⁷ Also, Japanese confidence in the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence suffered when North Korea launched an intermediate range ballistic missile over Japanese airspace in August 1998. Some Japan defense experts view U.S. responses to these North Korean

⁸⁴ Mondale's remarks of 16 September 1996 in *The New York Times* "was described by some quarters in Japan as troubling...he said American forces would not be compelled by the (Japan-U.S. security treaty) to intervene in a dispute over them." Hisayoshi Ina, "Balanced Diplomacy will not Work," *The Straits Times (Singapore)*, comment/analysis section, 18 December 1996: 40. Available [Online]: LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: News. File: Allnews [02 February 2000]. According to Nicholas Kristof, "Some Japanese officials say the United States would be obliged to use its military force to protect the Japanese claims to the islands, because of the Japan-American security treaty. But Ambassador Walter F. Mondale has noted that the United States takes no position on who owns the islands..." Nicholas D. Kristof, "An Asian Mini-tempest Over Mini Island Group," *The New York Times*, section A, 15 September 1996: 8. See also Kristof, "Would You Fight for These Islands?" *The New York Times*, 20 October 1996. Available [Online]: <<http://www.mthoyoke.edu/acad/intrel/diaoyu.htm>> [02 February 2000].

⁸⁵ Hisahiko Okazaki states that," U.S.-Chinese negotiations over the past 30 years [concerning Taiwan] can be seen as the history of gradual concessions by the United States in the face of persistent Chinese diplomatic pressure..." He claims that U.S. trustworthiness is at stake, "If the Taiwanese lost confidence in the ability of will of the United States to protect them...China would certainly step up its military and psychological pressure...That would be a tragedy on the scale of that which occurred in Czechoslovakia in 1938." Hisahiko Okazaki, "Status Quo Approach to Taiwan Needs Review," *Daily Yomiuri*, 24 January 2000.

⁸⁶ Julian Weiss, "Asia: America's Lost Horizon?" 27 January 2000. Available [Online]: <<http://www.intellectualcapital.com>> [01 February 2000].

⁸⁷ Hideshi Takesada contends that there are increasing doubts in Japan about U.S. resolve and ability to deter North Korea against Japan. Interview with Professor Hideshi Takesada of the Japan National Institute for Defense Studies.

threats as ineffective, and they are not convinced that the United States adequately considers Japanese interests as an ally in its bilateral dealings with North Korea. According to Colonel Paul Peyton of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, "the manner in which the United States has dealt with North Korea has eroded the confidence of some Japanese in U.S. policymaking. A danger is that other Asian players may see this as destabilizing."⁸⁸ Additionally, if and when the North Koreans deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of attacking the United States, Japanese fears of abandonment may increase. When the United States is put at greater risk, the Japanese may be more concerned that the United States will become less committed to consider Japanese interests when dealing with North Korea.⁸⁹ Hopefully an effective missile defense shield will help to alleviate these emerging Japanese concerns, but it is too early to know how effective this will be. Overall, U.S. credibility in Asia has declined in recent years, and so has its perceived commitment to Japan.⁹⁰

U.S. motives for maintaining the alliance also are viewed with skepticism in Japan. Many Japanese believe that the United States practices a de facto policy of "double containment" of Japan while acting in its own interest. The United States maintains a veto over Japanese ambitions by keeping it dependent upon the United States for defense, including nuclear defense. This serves to stabilize the region under

⁸⁸ Interview with Colonel Paul Peyton, U.S. Army, chairman, department of regional studies, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, 25 January 2000. See also "North Korea's Missiles," *Mainichi Daily News*, opinion/analysis section, 13 July 1999 and 15 September 1999: 2. Available [Online]: LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: News. File: Allnews [02 February 2000].

⁸⁹ Interview with Lieutenant Colonel J.T. Sink, U.S. Air Force, Japan desk officer, J5, plans and policy, HQ, U.S. CINCPAC, Honolulu, Hawaii, 24 January 2000.

⁹⁰ Bruce Gilley, "Asia Ignored," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Volume 161, Number 40, 01 October 1998: 26.

conditions favorable to U.S. interests, which may or may not be consistent with Japanese interests. Additionally, Japanese dependence upon the United States for defense provides the United States with a lever in trade negotiations. These negative views of U.S. alliance loyalty detract from perceptions of U.S. commitment to defend Japan with nuclear weapons if required. This increases Japanese concerns of abandonment and the likelihood that an aggressor will use nuclear blackmail to take advantage of or gain concessions from Japan, or manipulate the U.S.-Japan alliance.⁹¹

U.S. bargaining tactics for communicating its interests in defending Japan with nuclear weapons include the U.S.-Japan security treaty, the stationing of U.S. troops in Japan, and cooperative theater missile defense research and development. Bargaining tactics are that a defender identifies itself with the country to be defended, so that an attack upon the client appears to the adversary as an attack upon the defender.⁹² Bargaining tactics are the visible ties that demonstrate the linkage between U.S. and Japanese interests.

The United States and Japan maintain a security treaty and have developed specific guidelines for defense cooperation in the event of an attack upon Japan or contingencies in areas surrounding Japan involving U.S. forces. These agreements serve to demonstrate the strength of U.S. commitment to defend its interests in Japan, including

⁹¹ Interview with Christopher B. Johnstone, research fellow, Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, 25 January 2000; Shin'ichi Ogawa, "The Nuclear Security of Japan and South Korea: A Japanese View," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Volume 9, Number 1 (Summer 1997): 49; Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work?: Cases from 1900 to 1980," *World Politics*, Volume 36, Number 4 (July 1984): 512; Huth and Russet, "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation," *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 32, Number 1 (March 1988): 29-46.

⁹² Dean Wilkening and Kenneth Watman, 17.

the use of nuclear weapons.⁹³ Cooperative U.S.-Japanese theater missile defense research and development also improves the U.S. reputation for protecting its interests in Japan. However, actual deployment and adversary reaction to such a deployment remain uncertain.⁹⁴

The United States has significant interests in protecting its forward-deployed forces in Japan and the region. The United States has 100,000 troops stationed in East Asia, and 45,000 of them are in Japan. The United States operates many logistical facilities throughout Japan that support U.S. forces in East Asia, including those in the Republic of Korea. These forces and bases are essential to the U.S. security strategy for East Asia, and for any military action on the Korean peninsula, or in the Taiwan Straits.

U.S. forces are deployed in Japan and are located near many population centers. In the Tokyo area for example, where nearly half of Japan's population is concentrated, the U.S. military has a large presence. U.S. Air Forces Japan at Yokota Air Base is only 30 km northwest of downtown Tokyo, and the U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet is based at Yokosuka just 40 km southwest of downtown Tokyo. Any nuclear attack against Tokyo would almost certainly affect these forces. Likewise, any attack directed against U.S. forces here would affect large numbers of Japanese.⁹⁵

⁹³ According to the Article V, *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan*, 23 June 1960, "Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territory under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes." According to Article III, *The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation*, 23 September 1997, "In order to meet its commitments, the United States will maintain its nuclear deterrent capability, its forward deployed forces in the Asia-Pacific region, and other forces capable of reinforcing those forward deployed forces."

⁹⁴ Shawn W. Crispin and Susan V. Lawrence, "In Self-Defense," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Volume 162, Number 26, 01 July 1999: 22.

⁹⁵ Yuzuru Kaneko argued that despite this linkage, the "coupling" similar to what the United States had with NATO in the 1970s and 1980s is absent from the U.S. nuclear relationship with Japan

The legitimacy of employing U.S. nuclear weapons in defense of Japan has been affected by two developments: the marginalization of nuclear weapons in international politics and Japan's antinuclear sentiment. Nuclear weapons are becoming more marginalized in international politics for reasons outlined in Chapter I. Reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent has declined because the threat of large-scale nuclear war appears less than during the Cold War. More sophisticated conventional weapons can substitute for nuclear weapons without producing the extensive and long-term collateral damage and negative political ramifications that nuclear weapons would. There is significant research and development of theater and national missile defenses, and U.S. and international efforts to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons have expanded. These factors combine to increase the marginalization of nuclear weapons in international politics and reduce the legitimacy of using them as a means for deterring or conducting warfare.

Reliance on U.S. nuclear weapons in the defense of Japan runs counter to the strong antinuclear and pacifist sentiments that still exist in Japan, although some Japan defense analysts believe these sentiments are declining. Nevertheless, some Japanese still question the legitimacy of relying on U.S. nuclear weapons for the defense of Japan. Japanese pacifists do not believe in the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence and would argue that nuclear weapons are inherently an offensive weapon that increase the likelihood of conflict and nuclear war. Japan should not rely on the threat of nuclear

because no U.S. nuclear forces are based in Japan. Professor Kaneko argued that this coupling theory is necessary for effective extended nuclear deterrence. In other words, he agrees that U.S. forces based in Japan provide an alliance linkage, but not in the same sense that U.S. nuclear forces stationed in Europe provided nuclear deterrence "coupling" between the United States and NATO. Interview with Yuzuru Kaneko, professor at the Japan Defense Agency National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, 14 January 2000.

attack for the defense of their country, even nuclear defense, because this will result in disaster. These critics believe that the only reason Japan is threatened with nuclear weapons is because U.S. forces are based in Japan, and the United States makes Japan a nuclear target by violating the Japanese non-nuclear principles. These views, which are still significant, continue to detract from the legitimacy of defending Japan with U.S. nuclear weapons.⁹⁶

B. PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. CAPABILITIES

The United States has reduced the number of its nuclear weapons and readiness since the end of the Cold War, and this has reduced the relative credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.⁹⁷ Additionally, the reliability of existing nuclear weapons is declining because of weapons degradation and a lack of weapons test data due to U.S. observance of the CTBT.⁹⁸ However, Japanese concerns about the credibility of U.S. nuclear capabilities are based on the balance between U.S. and adversary nuclear capabilities. "As long as the United States maintains an advantage and can achieve escalation dominance over potential adversaries, U.S. force reductions to START II and III levels will not increase Japanese concerns of U.S. inability to fulfill its nuclear obligations,"

⁹⁶ See Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, *Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a Changing World* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell East Asia Series, 1993) 168.

⁹⁷ Patrick Morgan, 58.

⁹⁸ Andrew Koch, "Extending the Nuclear Family?" *Janes Defense Weekly*, analysis section, 05 January 2000.

says Shin'ichi Ogawa, senior research fellow at the Japan Defense Agency National Institute for Defense Studies.⁹⁹

The United States withdrew its tactical nuclear weapons from Northeast Asia in 1992, and it no longer deploys tactical nuclear weapons on air or naval platforms stationed in or on patrol in Northeast Asia. However, the United States still maintains its policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on ships or aircraft. The tactical nuclear weapons that had been deployed in the region were either put into storage in the continental United States or were destroyed. Full redeployment of these weapons to the region could take anywhere from weeks to months, and reflects a much lower level of readiness than during the Cold War when large numbers of these weapons were probably deployed in the region and ready for use on short notice. Nevertheless, because the U.S. nuclear guarantee is a de facto retaliatory promise for which strategic nuclear weapons can be employed, the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Northeast Asia seems to have had little or no effect on the Japanese perception of U.S. credibility. Actually, because there is less suspicion now of U.S. violations of Japan's non-nuclear principles, withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the region can be seen as an improvement of the U.S. reputation as a loyal Japanese ally.

⁹⁹ According to Shin'ichi Ogawa, when discussing capability, the quality and structure of the force should also be considered. Furthermore, he contends that the United States could reduce its nuclear arsenal to significantly lower numbers of warheads as long as it maintains a secure second strike counterforce and escalation dominance ability. In this way, Japan would remain reassured of the credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence despite continued arms reductions. Interview with Shin'ichi Ogawa of the Japan National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, 14 January 2000.

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IV. THE EFFECTS OF CREDIBILITY

A. CREDIBILITY AND THE ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA

The credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent extended to Japan affects Japanese fears about U.S. abandonment of its nuclear obligations on one hand, and fears of becoming involved in conflicts involving the use or threat of use of U.S. nuclear weapons on the other. To alter the balance between these competing Japanese concerns, the United States can decrease, stabilize, or increase its commitment and capability as components of the credibility of its nuclear deterrent extended to Japan. To find a balance that will help maintain the alliance and discourage nuclear proliferation, I will weigh the importance of four related U.S. goals: reducing Japanese concerns about U.S. abandonment of its nuclear obligations for the defense of Japan; reducing Japanese concerns about becoming entrapped in U.S. conflicts involving the use of nuclear weapons; gaining Japanese political acceptance; and discouraging regional nuclear proliferation. Each goal is weighted on a three-point scale (Tables 1 and 2, columns B) and multiplied by the relative magnitude of shifts in U.S. commitment and capability. The results of this process are shown at the bottom of Tables 1 and 2 and reflect the projected direction and relative magnitude of shifts in U.S. commitment and capability upon these four U.S. goals.

B. THE EFFECTS OF COMMITMENT

The effects of decreasing, stabilizing, or increasing the level of U.S. nuclear commitment on Japanese concerns about abandonment and entrapment, Japanese

political acceptance, and nuclear proliferation are numerically reflected in Table 1 and explained below.

U.S. Goals (A)	Goals Weighted on a 3-point Scale (B)	Changes in U. S. Commitment					
		Relative Magnitude of Shifts in U. S. Commitment			Relative Weighted Magnitude of Shifts in U. S. Commitment		
		Decreased Commitment (C)	Stable Commitment (D)	Increased Commitment (E)	Decreased Commitment (BxC)	Stable Commitment (BxD)	Increased Commitment (BxE)
Abandonment	2	-3	-2	-1	-6	-4	-2
Entrapment	1	0	-1	-2	0	-1	-2
Political Acceptance	2	1	3	2	2	6	4
Nuclear proliferation	3	-3	-2	-1	-9	-6	-3
Projected Direction and Relative Magnitude of Shifts in U.S. Commitment Upon U.S. goals.		-> -> ->		-13	-5	-3	

Table 1. Impact of Varying Levels of U.S. Commitment on U.S. Goals to Reduce Japanese Concerns About Abandonment and Entrapment, Gain Japanese Political Acceptance, and Discourage Nuclear Proliferation ¹⁰⁰

1. The Effects of Commitment on Japanese Concerns about Abandonment

Ideally, a balance should be found where Japanese concerns about abandonment and entrapment are low. As I have said, while Japanese concerns about entrapment already appear to be low, concerns about abandonment appear to be greater. The

¹⁰⁰ Column A (U.S. Goals) lists four U.S. goals: reduce Japanese concerns about abandonment, reduce Japanese concerns about entrapment, gain Japanese political acceptance, and discourage regional nuclear proliferation; column B (Goals weighted on a 3-point scale) show the relative importance of each U.S. goal; columns C, D, and E under "Relative Magnitude of Shifts in U.S. Commitment," show the relative magnitude/effect of shifts in U.S. commitment on U.S. goals from column A. A negligible effect is assigned a value of 0; a low level of effect is -1 or 1 depending on whether it has is positive or negative impact; a moderate level of effect is -2 or 2; a high level of effect is -3 or 3. The values shown on the far right in the columns under "Relative Weighted Magnitude of Shifts in U.S. Commitment" are the results of multiplying the relative weights from column B with the values from columns C, D, and E. The overall value of each option (decrease, stabilize, increase commitment) is reflected in the bottom row, "Projected Direction and Relative Magnitude of Shifts in U.S. Commitment Upon U.S. goals.

Japanese have few feasible alternatives to the U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S. nuclear guarantee. According to Takashi Inoguchi, chairman of the political science department, School of Oriental Culture at Tokyo University, “Japan will not have feasible alternatives to the U.S.-Japan security relationship for at least 25 years.”¹⁰¹ These limited options cause greater dependence on the United States and increase the risks and costs associated with U.S. abandonment. We can say that Japanese concerns about abandonment are moderate compared to a low level concern about entrapment. Therefore, abandonment receives a weight of 2, and entrapment receives a weight of 1 (Table 1, column B).

If U.S. commitment is decreased from where it is perceived to be now, Japanese concerns about abandonment will increase, and we can describe that level as high compared to today’s moderate level of concern (Table 1, column C). The nuclear threat to Japan is enough so that a decrease in U.S. commitment to use nuclear weapons in defense of Japan would increase Japanese concerns about U.S. abandonment of its nuclear obligations.¹⁰² Stabilizing commitment at current levels may cause Japanese concerns about abandonment to remain at the moderate level they are at now or slightly increase because some doubt about U.S. commitment already exists (Table 1, column D). An increase in U.S. commitment would reduce Japanese concerns about U.S.

¹⁰¹ Interview with Takashi Inoguchi, professor, Department of Political Science, School of Oriental Culture, Tokyo University, 13 January 2000.

¹⁰² Shin’ichi Ogawa concurs that there would be greater Japanese concerns about abandonment if the U.S. decreased its commitment to employ nuclear weapons in defense of Japan. He stated that more of a balance would be achieved between Japanese concerns about abandonment and entrapment if U.S. commitment was improved. Interview with Professor Shin’ichi Ogawa of the Japan National Institute for Defense Studies.

abandonment of its nuclear obligations to a low level compared to today's moderate level of concern (Table 1, column E), and this would be welcomed by the Japanese.¹⁰³

2. The Effects of Commitment on Japanese Concerns about Entrapment

Increased U.S. commitment could cause Japanese concerns about entrapment to rise from today's low level if it was not done correctly. According to Masashi Nishihara, if U.S. clarification of its nuclear commitment to Japan was not handled properly, it could provoke both the Japanese public and potential U.S.-Japan adversaries.¹⁰⁴ Assuming Japanese concerns about entrapment are at a low level now relative to concerns about abandonment, a decrease in U.S. commitment would further reduce Japanese concerns about entrapment to a negligible level (Table 1, column C). If U.S. commitment is increased, Japanese concerns about entrapment may increase to a moderate level from the low level they are at now (Table 1, column E).

3. Commitment and Japanese Political Acceptance

Despite the opening of the defense debate in Japan to include topics that were once taboo, discussing nuclear strategy remains difficult. Therefore, any change to the status quo that may require debate or discussion among the Japanese may prove to be very controversial. Simply talking about nuclear weapons can be politically risky. Additionally, it is the official position of the Japanese government to promote continued nuclear arms reductions and the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. Gaining

¹⁰³ Members of the Japan Foreign Ministry stated that the GOJ would welcome a U.S. clarification of its nuclear deterrence extended to Japan. Interview with members of the Japan Foreign Ministry.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Professor Masashi Nishihara of the Japan National Defense Academy.

political acceptance in Japan for changes to nuclear policy is therefore very difficult yet essential to the healthy functioning of the alliance. If Japan is seriously opposed to U.S. nuclear policy and strategy, it will become very difficult to support a U.S. nuclear umbrella. Japanese acceptance and understanding of U.S. nuclear policy and strategy is necessary for legitimate U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. Therefore, Japanese political acceptance is assigned a weight of 2 (Table 1, column B).

Decreasing U.S. commitment to defend Japan with nuclear weapons would most likely receive a low level of political acceptance in Japan. Decreased reliance on nuclear weapons would be popular among the left wing in Japan, and decreased reliance on the United States in general would be welcomed by those on the far right who are pushing for a normal defense policy that is not overly dependent upon the United States. Decreasing U.S. commitment would probably be opposed by the political mainstream, however, because it would increase concerns about U.S. abandonment, put Japan at greater risk, and cause and increase in regional tensions. These are the effects that the left would dispute and the far right would welcome. The left would argue that any decrease in emphasis on nuclear weapons will ease regional tensions and reduce the likelihood of conflict, while the right would use it to highlight concerns about U.S. abandonment and the need for a normal defense policy. Therefore, I believe that left wing and far right wing support for such a policy would be checked by opposition from the political mainstream, and actual political acceptance for such a policy would be low (see Table 1, column C).

Stabilizing U.S. commitment to defend Japan with nuclear weapons at current levels would be the most politically acceptable option in Japan simply because avoidance

of discussion of nuclear weapons issues could be maximized and this would pose the least political risk in Japan. For this reason most politicians would support the status quo and acceptance for this approach would be high (Table 1, column D).

Increasing the U.S. commitment to defend Japan with nuclear weapons would achieve a moderate level of political support in Japan (Table 1, column E). There could be strong mainstream support for such an option, but this would probably be moderated by opposition from the left and far right. The left would oppose it because greater emphasis would be placed on the importance of nuclear weapons, and the far right would oppose it because it increases dependence upon the United States.

4. The Effects of Commitment on Regional Nuclear Proliferation

Because discouraging regional nuclear proliferation is such an important overall U.S. foreign policy objective it is given a weight of 3 in its relative value of importance to the other three U.S. goals (Table 1, column B). A decrease in U.S. commitment to defend Japan with nuclear weapons would significantly raise regional suspicions of Japanese intentions to pursue independent nuclear forces, and this would increase the likelihood of regional nuclear proliferation to a high level from today's low level (Table 1, column C). Japan has the economic and industrial capacity to independently produce nuclear weapons in a relatively short period of time. What they do not have, however, is the political will or necessity to do so. The Japanese nuclear taboo makes domestic consideration of independent Japanese nuclear forces politically unfeasible, and reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella makes it politically unnecessary. If, however, the U.S. nuclear umbrella was weakened or removed, the political necessity for considering

nuclear forces would increase, and this would likewise increase regional suspicions that Japan might somehow overcome its nuclear taboo and pursue independent nuclear forces. In order to prepare for such a possibility, other regional powers would increase their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and means of delivery (i.e., ballistic missiles, reentry vehicles, etc.).

Stabilizing the status quo of U.S. commitment to defend Japan with nuclear weapons will continue to increase the likelihood of regional nuclear proliferation to a moderate level (Table 1, column D). As Japanese concerns about abandonment and the seriousness of the defense debate in Japan slowly increase due to the erosion of U.S. credibility and increased Japanese perceptions of regional threats, adversary suspicions of Japanese nuclear ambitions will likewise continue to increase.

Increasing U.S. commitment to defend Japan with nuclear weapons will at least help to stop or slow the increase of these suspicions, and this should improve the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to discourage regional nuclear proliferation, and keep the likelihood of a regional nuclear arms race at today's low level (Table 1, column E).

5. Conclusion

It is evident from Table 1 that increasing U.S. commitment to defend Japan with nuclear weapons produces the least negative effects to overall accomplishment of U.S. goals. Clearly, decreasing U.S. commitment would cause serious problems for maintaining the alliance and discouraging nuclear proliferation. Although stabilizing U.S. commitment at current levels is not much different in value from increasing U.S.

commitment, increasing commitment offers further improvements to the accomplishment of U.S. goals.

B. THE EFFECTS OF CAPABILITY

The effects of decreasing, stabilizing, or increasing the level of U.S. nuclear capability on Japanese concerns about abandonment and entrapment, Japanese political acceptance, and nuclear proliferation are numerically reflected in Table 2 and are explained below.

U.S. Goals (A)	Goals Weighted on a 3-point Scale (B)	Change in U. S. Capability					
		Relative Magnitude of Shifts in U. S. Capability			Relative Weighted Magnitude of Shifts in U. S. Capability		
		Decreased Capability (C)	Stable Capability (D)	Increased Capability (E)	Decreased Capability (BxC)	Stable Capability (BxD)	Increased Capability (BxE)
Abandonment	2	-1	0	0	-2	0	0
Entrapment	1	0	-2	-3	0	-2	-6
Political Acceptance	2	3	-2	-3	6	-4	-6
Non- proliferation	3	-1	-2	-3	-3	-6	-9
Projected Direction and Relative Magnitude of Shifts in U.S. Capability Upon U.S. goals.		>>>>			1	-12	-21

Table 2. Impact of Varying Levels of U.S. Capability on U.S. Goals to Reduce Japanese Concerns About Abandonment and Entrapment, Gain Japanese Political Acceptance, and Discourage Nuclear Proliferation ¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ The method for calculating values is the same here as in Table 1 (see footnote 100).

1. The Effects of Capability on Japanese Concerns about Abandonment

The Japanese will remain assured that the United States has the capability to extend nuclear deterrence to them as long as the United States maintains the ability to achieve escalation dominance over potential adversary nuclear forces.¹⁰⁶ There is some debate and concern in both the United States and Japan about what level of capability is adequate for this purpose, and whether it is possible to demonstrate capable nuclear forces without conducting periodic nuclear tests under the CTBT. As long as adversaries continue to observe the CTBT as well, and the United States maintains an ability to achieve escalation dominance, these concerns will be reduced. Therefore, continued decreases in U.S. nuclear capabilities to START II or even START III levels while continuing to observe the CTBT will only have a low effect on Japanese concerns about abandonment (Table 2, column C).

A freeze in reductions or an increase in U.S. nuclear capabilities will not affect Japanese concerns about abandonment (Table 2, columns D and E), but will have an effect on concerns about entrapment.

2. The Effects of Capability on Japanese Concerns about Entrapment

Continuing to decrease U.S. nuclear capabilities will reduce Japanese concerns about entrapment in a U.S. conflict involving the use of nuclear weapons from today's low level to a negligible level (Table 2, column C).¹⁰⁷ A freeze in U.S. nuclear arms

¹⁰⁶ Yuzuru Kaneko argues that escalation dominance is what makes U.S. nuclear deterrence credible. Also interviews with members of the Japan Foreign Ministry. The members believe that reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal does not affect U.S. credibility as long as a strategic balance remains with adversaries. Interview with Professor Yuzuru Kaneko of the Japan National Institute for Defense Studies.

¹⁰⁷ A lack of Japanese concern about entrapment could cause problems for the United States if it is not careful. A lack of Japanese concern could actually serve to encourage a more aggressive U.S. policy

reductions without an obvious increase in the current level of threat against the United States or Japan would slightly increase Japanese concerns about entrapment from a low level to a moderate level (Table 2, column D).¹⁰⁸ It would be difficult for the Japanese government to support such a U.S. policy unless there was a clear threat that could be demonstrated to the Japanese, such as another North Korean missile launch over Japanese airspace. Short of this, however, a U.S. policy to discontinue nuclear arms reductions would be seen by the Japanese as belligerent and risky, increasing the likelihood of regional conflict that could involve the Japanese. If this was done in response to a demonstrated increase in adversary nuclear capabilities, however, and was seen as necessary, quiet Japanese government support is conceivable.

An increase in U.S. nuclear capabilities would increase Japanese concerns about entrapment to a high level (Table 2, column E), even if this were done in reaction to adversary nuclear capability improvements. Commander Murphy believes that there have always been real fears of entrapment in Japan, and that is why they have maintained the principle of no collective self-defense for so long.¹⁰⁹ There are, however, new efforts to discard this principle, and this may be an indication of a lack of confidence in the U.S. alliance. An increase in U.S. nuclear capabilities would almost certainly accompany a decline in regional security, and the likelihood of U.S. involvement in a conflict

toward the region, and this could help to embolden the Japanese. Lack of Japanese concern about perceived aggressive U.S. policies could raise suspicions about Japan's motives, raise regional tensions, and increase the likelihood of conflict between Japan and its neighbors. In either case, regional stability could decrease, and the United States could find itself entrapped in an unwanted conflict.

¹⁰⁸ Although the left wing has been weakened in recent years, they still enjoy some political influence, especially at local and regional levels, and remain outspoken about entrapment in U.S. conflicts involving the use or threat of use of U.S. nuclear weapons.

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Commander Murphy of the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo.

involving another nuclear force such as China or Russia. A U.S. policy to improve nuclear capabilities either by building more warheads and or delivery systems, or by discontinuing observance of the CTBT would most likely be precipitated by Russian efforts to do the same, or rapid Chinese advances in nuclear stockpiles or technologies.¹¹⁰

3. Capability and Japanese Political Acceptance

Japanese political support for shifts in U.S. nuclear capabilities is necessary for the legitimacy of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence to Japan. Because of Japan's unique experience with the horrors of nuclear war, any reduction in the number of nuclear weapons or nuclear capability would be considered positively, and any move to halt reductions or increase capabilities would be viewed negatively. There is not much open discussion of security issues in Japan, let alone nuclear weapons, so the pros and cons of nuclear deterrence would not be considered as thoroughly as it would in the United States or Europe. Therefore, the status quo of continued U.S. nuclear arms reductions receives a high level of political acceptance in Japan (Table 2, column C). Stabilizing U.S. nuclear capabilities by freezing nuclear arms reductions at current levels could only be supported by the Japanese government if it was clear that the United States could not maintain an advantage over an adversary. Even then, this would be moderately unacceptable (Table 2, column D) among most Japanese who do not discuss nor understand the concept of nuclear deterrence. Increasing U.S. nuclear capabilities would be greatly unacceptable in Japan (Table 2, column E) and could not be supported by the Japanese government under

¹¹⁰ See appendix D for current Chinese nuclear force levels. For the impact of suspected increases in Chinese nuclear force capabilities see H. Josef Herbert, "Report Says U.S. Secrets Helped China," *AP Online*, 20 May 1999. Available [Online]: <<http://www.northernlight.com>> [28 November 1999].

almost any circumstance short of a renewal of the Cold War. Even then most Japanese would probably be very opposed to such a move by the United States.

4. The Effects of Capability on Regional Nuclear Proliferation

The level of U.S. nuclear capability may influence adversary perceptions of Japanese nuclear ambitions, and this may influence their motivation for pursuing nuclear weapons themselves. Adversary motivations for pursuing nuclear weapons will decline if their suspicions of Japanese nuclear ambitions also decline. Conversely, if adversary suspicions of Japanese nuclear ambitions are increased, their motivations for pursuing nuclear weapons will increase as well. If the United States continues to reduce the quality and quantity of its nuclear forces, while continuing to declare a reduced role for nuclear weapons as part of overall U.S. strategy, adversaries may perceive increased Japanese insecurity, increase their suspicion of Japanese nuclear ambitions, and supply them with more reason for pursuing nuclear weapons. On the other hand, it can be argued that reduced U.S. emphasis on nuclear weapons reinforces nonproliferation by showing adversaries that the United States does not need to rely so much on nuclear weapons. This can help to counter the effects of increased adversary suspicion of Japanese intentions. Therefore, continued decreases in U.S. nuclear capabilities may keep the likelihood of regional nuclear proliferation at today's low level (Table 2, column C).

If the United States should unilaterally, or together with the Russians, stabilize nuclear capability by freezing nuclear arms reductions at current levels, this would increase the likelihood of regional nuclear proliferation to a moderate level (Table 2,

column D). Although stabilizing U.S. nuclear capabilities by freezing continued U.S. nuclear arms reductions may help to ease Japanese insecurity, and reduce adversary suspicion of Japanese nuclear ambitions, a U.S. freeze would most likely occur due to a decline in the overall security environment. A freeze in U.S. nuclear reductions would also be a setback for the nonproliferation regime.

If the United States should increase nuclear capabilities unilaterally or along with the Russians, the likelihood of regional nuclear proliferation will increase to a high level (Table 2, column E). Such a move on the part of the United States would accompany an overall breakdown in the security environment, and would probably mean an end to the nonproliferation regime.

5. Conclusion

Table 2 reflects the relative impact of shifts in U.S. nuclear capabilities upon the accomplishment of the stated U.S. goals: reducing Japanese concerns of abandonment and entrapment, gaining Japanese political support, and reducing the likelihood of regional nuclear proliferation. It is clear from this table that decreasing U.S. nuclear capabilities best accomplishes these U.S. goals.

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V. CONCLUSIONS

The reduced role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy combined with a perceived weakening of U.S. commitment to Japan has eroded the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent extended to Japan. This has contributed to an increase in Japanese concerns about U.S. abandonment of its nuclear obligations. Perceptions of Japanese insecurity raise adversary suspicions of Japanese nuclear ambitions and increase their motivation for pursuing nuclear weapons.

The credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence extended to Japan is affected more by commitment than capability because the Japanese believe the United States will maintain an advantage over potential adversaries even while it continues arms reductions. Continued U.S. nuclear arms reductions help to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. A freeze of these reductions or an increase in U.S. nuclear capabilities would be very unpopular in Japan regardless of the circumstances. The Japanese government could not openly support such a U.S. policy and this would detract from the legitimacy of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence for Japan. Also, an increase in U.S. nuclear capabilities would most likely accompany an increase in regional tensions, and Japanese concerns about entrapment in a U.S. conflict could place further strain on the alliance, putting Japanese support for U.S. forces in the region at risk.

Although extending nuclear deterrence to Japan remains problematic, the need for nuclear deterrence is becoming more important for Japan, and the United States must find ways to improve its credibility to accommodate this. The continued existence and progress of regional nuclear and missile threats combined with long-term concerns of

Chinese intentions and nuclear capabilities increase Japanese needs for nuclear deterrence and dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. According to Sam Jameson, “Japanese fears of China and its nuclear weapons are the ultimate purpose of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the post-Cold War era.”¹¹¹ Increased dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella also increases Japanese concerns about abandonment because the risks to Japan become greater if U.S. obligations go unfulfilled. Japanese concerns about U.S. abandonment along with growing regional security threats have given greater legitimacy to those who argue that Japan should become a “normal” country with military forces like other great powers. This has helped to stimulate the defense debate within Japan. Subjects that were once taboo for discussion in public forums are becoming more acceptable. However, perceptions of Japanese moves in the direction of a normal country in the absence of U.S. nuclear reassurances to Japan will raise suspicions of Japanese nuclear ambitions and encourage further regional nuclear and missile proliferation.¹¹²

Since discussion of defense issues are occurring more frequently in Japan now, and some discussion of nuclear issues is emerging despite the taboo, there are now more opportunities for the United States to participate and improve the perception of the credibility of its extended nuclear deterrent. This can be accomplished by increasing U.S.-Japanese government to government and military to military contacts for discussions of this topic, to include specific reassurances of the U.S. commitment to the nuclear defense of Japan. However, an absence of U.S. participation in these emerging discussions will reinforce Japanese concerns about potential U.S. abandonment and

¹¹¹ Interview with Sam Jameson of the Yomiuri Research Institute.

further erode the credibility of the U.S. deterrent. The United States cannot allow misperceptions of its lack of commitment to Japan to reinforce arguments or suspicions that Japan should or will consider a nuclear option of its own.

These misperceptions would weaken the U.S.-Japan alliance, encourage nuclear proliferation, and cause an overall decrease in regional stability. The United States must take steps now to improve the credibility of its nuclear deterrent extended to Japan and maintain the initiative with both the Japanese and regional adversaries. Increasing efforts to improve the perception of U.S. commitment to Japan while continuing to pursue modest nuclear arms reductions and missile defenses can effectively counter these misperceptions without overly provoking either the Japanese public or potential adversaries.

¹¹² Interview with Commander Murphy of the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo; Andrew Mack, "Nuclear Proliferation in Northeast Asia: What are the Risks?" 1996 Conference Paper, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. Available [Online]: <http://www.acdss.gov.au.htm> [22 May 1999].

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APPENDIX A. U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

Reference: Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. McDonough with Toby F. Dalton and Gregory D. Koblentz, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998). Available [Online] at <<http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/Numbers/numbers.htm>> [28 November 1999].

	September 1990 ¹	July 1998 ²	December 2007 ³	December 2007 ⁴
ICBMs				
MX	500	500	0	0
Minuteman III	1,500	1,950	500 ⁵	300 ⁶
Minuteman II	450	1	0	0
Subtotal	2,450	2,451	500	300
Poseidon (C-3)	1,920	320	0	0
Trident I (C-4)	3,072	1,536	0	0
Trident II (D-5)	768	1,920	1,680 ⁷	1,008 ⁸
Subtotal	5,760	3,776	1,680	1,008
B-52	2,258	1,644	980 ⁹	364 ¹⁰
B-1	95	91	0	0
B-2	0	20	336	336
Subtotal	2,353	1,755	1,316	700
TOTAL	10,563	7,982	~3,500	~2,000

Notes:

1. Warhead numbers are based on START I counting rules. This results in bombers having fewer warheads attributed to them than they actually carry. On the other hand, even though all Poseidon submarines have been decommissioned, their C-3 SLBMs and associated warheads remain START-accountable until the delivery systems have been destroyed.
2. Same as above.
3. Assumes that START II enters into force, but that START III is not successfully negotiated. Figures are based on START II counting rules. This means that the number of weapons counted for heavy bombers will be the number they are actually equipped to carry.
4. Assumes that START III is successfully negotiated. Under this treaty, the United States and Russia will be permitted to deploy 2,000-2,500 strategic warheads each.
5. Assumes 500 Minuteman IIIs, with each missile carrying one warhead.
6. Assumes 300 Minuteman IIIs, with each missile carrying one warhead.
7. Assumes 14 Ohio-class submarines carrying 24 Trident II (D-5) missiles each, with all D-5s carrying five warheads.
8. Assumes 14 Ohio-class submarines carrying 24 Trident II (D-5) missiles each, with all D-5s carrying three warheads.
9. Assumes that the United States maintains its entire fleet of 71 B-52 bombers, but reduces their cruise-missile carrying capacity.
10. Assumes that the United States maintains its entire fleet of 71 B-52 bombers, but reduces their cruise-missile carrying capacity.

Sources: ACA, DOD, START I Memoranda of Understanding of September 1990 and July 1998, STRATCOM.

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APPENDIX B. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR FORCES, 1998

Reference: Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. McDonough with Toby F. Dalton and Gregory D. Koblentz, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998). Available [Online] at <<http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/Numbers/numbers.htm>> [28 November 1999].

Type/Name	Launcher/SSBNs	Year Deployed	Warheads x yield (kt)	Total warheads
ICBMs				
Minuteman III (Mk-12)	200	1970	3 x 170	600
Minuteman III (Mk-12A)	300	1979	3 x 335	900
MX Peacekeeper	50	1986	10 x 300	500
Total	550		550 MT	2,000
SLBMs				
Trident I C-4	192/8	1979	8 x 100	1,536
Trident II D-5 (Mk-4)	240/10	1992	8 x 100	1,536
Trident II D-5 (Mk-5)		1990	8 x 475	384
Total	432/18		490 MT	3,456
BOMBERS				
B-2 Spirit	21/9	1994	ALCM 1 x 5-150	400
B-52H Stratofortress	71/44	1961	ACM 1 x 5-150	400
			B61, B83 bombs (sub kt to 1.3 MT)	1,000
Total	92/53		770 MT	1,800
NON-STRATEGIC WEAPONS				
B61 Bombs		1979	.3-170	650
SLCMs		1984	1 x 5-150	320
Total			n/a	970
OTHER WEAPONS				
Hedge/Reserve				2,300
Awaiting Dismantlement/Disposal				1,350
GRAND TOTAL			1,800 MT (deployed weapons)	12,070

NOTES

1. Figures in this table represent total operational forces, not just forces accountable under START I.
2. Principle sources for this table include: William Arkin, Robert Norris, and Joshua Handler, *Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments, 1998* (Washington, D.C.: NRDC Nuclear Program, 1998); Robert Norris and William Arkin, "United States Strategic Nuclear Forces, End of 1997," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January/February 1998, pp 70-2; Robert Norris and William Arkin, "United States Strategic Nuclear Forces, End of 1997," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January/February 1997, pp 70-2 Arms Control Association Factfile, "U.S. and Soviet/Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces: Past, Present and Projected," *Arms Control Today*, October 1996, p. 29.

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APPENDIX C. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES, 1998

Reference: Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. McDonough with Toby F. Dalton and Gregory D. Koblentz, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998). Available [Online] at <<http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/Numbers/numbers.htm>> [28 November 1999].

Type/ Name	Launcher/ SSBNs	Year Deployed	Warheads x yield (kt)	Total warheads
ICBMs				
SS-18 Satan (RS-20)	180	1979	10 x 550/750	1,800
SS-19 Stiletto (RS-18)	160	1979	6 x 550	960
SS-24 Scalpel (RS-22)	36/10	1987	10 x 550	460
SS-25 Sickle (RS-12M)	360	1985	1 x 550	360
SS-27 (Topol-M)	10	1997	1 x 550	10
Total	756		2,167 MT	3,590
SLBMs				
SS-N-18 Stingray (RSM-50)	176/11	1978	3 x 500	528
SS-N-20 Sturgeon (RSM-52)	60/3	1983	10 x 200	600
SS-N-23 Skiff (RSM-54)	112/7	1986	4 x 100	448
Total	348		429 MT	1,576
BOMBERS				
Tu-95/Bear-H6	29	1984	6 AS-15A ALCMs	174
Tu-95/Bear-H16	35	1984	16 AS-15A ALCMs or bombs	560
Tu-160/Blackjack	6	1987	AS-15B ALCMs or AS-16 SRAMSS or bombs	72
Total	70		202	806

Russian Nuclear Forces, 1998 (con't)

NON-STRATEGIC WEAPONS			
Strategic Defense			
ABM	SH-08 Gazelle, SH-11 Gorgon	100	100
SAM	SA-5B Gammon, SA-10 Grumble	1100	1100
Land-based Non-strategic			
Bombers and Fighters	Backfire(120), Fencer (280)	400	1600
Naval Non-strategic			
Attack aircraft	Backfire (70), Fencer (70)	140	400
SLCMs	SS-N-9, SS-N-12, SS-N-19, SS-N-21, SS-N-22		500
ASW Weapons	SS-N-15, SS-N-16, torpedoes		300
Total			~4,000
OTHER WEAPONS			
Reserve/Awaiting Dismantlement			~12,000
GRAND TOTAL		~2,700 MT (strategic weapons)	~22,250

NOTES:

1. Figures in this table represent total operational forces, not just forces accountable under START I.
2. Principle sources for this table include: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Monterey Institute of International Studies, *Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union* (Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment, 1998); William Arkin, Robert Norris, and Joshua Handler, *Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments, 1998* (Washington, D.C.: NRDC Nuclear Program, 1998); Robert Norris and William Arkin, "Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, End of 1997," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March/April 1998, pp 70-1; Arms Control Association Factfile, "U.S. and Soviet/Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces: Past, Present and Projected," *Arms Control Today*, October 1996, p. 29.

APPENDIX D. CHINESE NUCLEAR FORCES, 1999

Reference: Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. McDonough with Toby F. Dalton and Gregory D. Koblentz, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998). Available [Online] at <<http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/Numbers/numbers.htm>> [28 November 1999].

Recent Developments

- Robert Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs gave a declassified report at the Carnegie Endowment on September 17, 1998 that revealed that the intelligence community believes China to have "about 20 CSS-4 (DF-5) ICBMs" and that these missiles unfueled and without their warheads mated.
- Expansion of Chinese ICBM arsenal: *The Washington Times* reported on 7/21/98 that China added 6 new DF-5 ICBMs to its strategic nuclear arsenal, bringing the number of missiles capable of targeting the United States from a generous estimate of eighteen to 24.

Type/ Designatio n	Launchers Deployed	First Deployed	Range (km)	Warheads x yield	Warheads
LAND - BASED MISSILES					
DF-3 (3A)	40-50	1971	2,650 (2,800)	1 x 3.3 MT	50
DF-4	10-20	1980	4,750	1 x 3.3 MT	20
DF-5 (5A)	~20 ¹	?	12,000 (13,000)	1 x 4-5 MT; MIRV tested	~20
DF-21 (21A)	40	1985-6	1,700 (1,800)	1 x 200-300 kt	36
DF-25	0	development	1,700	n/a	0
DF-31	0	development	8,000	1 x 200-300 kt	0
DF-41	0	development	12,000	MIRV	0
SEA LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES					
Julang-1	12	1986	1,700	1 x 200-300kt	12
Julang-2	0	development	8,000	1 x 100-200 kt	0
AIRCRAFT					
H-6	120	1965	3,100	1-3 bomb (10kt -3MT)	120
Q-5	30	1970	400	1 bomb (10kt - 3 MT)	30
TACTICAL WEAPONS					
Artillery/SR Ms				low kt	120
TOTAL				~410 MT	400

NOTES:

Sources for this table also include William Arkin, Robert Norris, and Joshua Handler, *Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments, 1998* (Washington, D.C.: NRDC Nuclear Program, 1998); International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1997/8* (London: Oxford University Press, 1997).

1. There are varying reports as to the number of DF-5 (CSS-4) missiles in China's inventory. Unconfirmed reports by anonymous intelligence officials have placed the number as high as 24, while the International Institute for Strategic Studies places the total count at 7. See Bill Gertz, "China adds 6 ICBMs to arsenal," *The Washington Times*, July 21, 1998, p. A1, and "China Targets Nukes at U.S.:CIA Missile Report contradicts Clinton," *Washington Times*, May 1, 1998, p. A1; Most recently, Robert Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs placed the number at "about 20." in remarks given at the Carnegie Endowment, September 17, 1998.
2. Recent reports have claimed that China is increasing its ballistic missile force aimed at Taiwan. (see Bill Gertz, "Chinese Missiles Menace Taiwan," *Washington Times*, February 11, 1999. The report claimed that China had produced 150 M-9 and M-11 (short-range ballistic missiles) and was facing the majority of the force toward Taiwan. It should be noted that these are non-nuclear systems, and are not represented in this chart.
3. 310 MT is a good estimate for the yield of China's ballistic missile forces. The bombs, however, with a range of 10kt to 3MT pose a slight problem. We estimate the bomb force to have a yield of approximately 100 megatons.

APPENDIX E. NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE

Reference: Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. McDonough with Toby F. Dalton and Gregory D. Koblentz, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998). Available [Online] at <<http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/Numbers/numbers.htm>> [28 November 1999].

NAME/LOCATION OF FACILITY	TYPE/STATUS	IAEA SAFEGUARDS
POWER REACTORS		
Sinpo (Kumho)	Light-water, 1000 MWe; ground broken in August 1997.	Yes
Yongbyon	Gas-graphite, natural U, 5 MWe; operations frozen.	IAEA verifying freeze in operations.
Yongbyon	Gas-graphite, natural U, 50 MWe; construction halted.	IAEA verifying construction freeze.
Taechon	Gas-graphite, natural U, 200 MWe; construction halted.	IAEA verifying construction freeze.
RESEARCH REACTORS		
IRT, Yongbyon	Pool-type, HEU, 4 MWt; operating.	Yes
Yongbyon	Critical assembly.	Yes
Pyongyang	Sub-critical assembly.	Yes
REPROCESSING (PLUTONIUM EXTRACTION)		
Yongbyon	Partially completed; operations frozen.	Yes
Pyongyang	Soviet-supplied laboratory-scale "hot cells."	No
URANIUM PROCESSING		
Pyongsan	Uranium mining; status unknown.	N/A (Not Applicable)
Pakchon (Sunchon-Wolbingson mine)	Uranium mining; status unknown.	N/A
Pyongsan	Uranium milling; status unknown.	N/A
Pakchon	Uranium milling; status unknown.	N/A
Yongbyon	Uranium purification (UO_2) facility; operating.	Yes
Yongbyon	Fuel fabrication facility; operations frozen.	Yes
Yongbyon	Pilot-scale fuel fabrication facility; dismantled, according to North Korean officials.	No

Abbreviations:

HEU = highly enriched uranium
LEU = low-enriched uranium
nat. U = natural uranium
MWe = millions of watts of electrical output
MWt = millions of watts of thermal output
KWt = thousands of watts of thermal output

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